Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An Analysis of Employees and Employers Who Operate in the Borderland Between and Employer-and-Employee Reationship by Rubinstein, Mitchell H.
RUBINSTEIN_FINALIZEDONE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2012 11:22 AM 
 
605 
Articles 
EMPLOYEES, EMPLOYERS, AND QUASI-
EMPLOYERS: AN ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYEES AND 
EMPLOYERS WHO OPERATE IN THE 
BORDERLAND BETWEEN AN EMPLOYER-AND-
EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP 
Mitchell H. Rubinstein* 
 
Few problems in the law have given greater variety of application 
and conflict in results than the cases arising in the borderland 
between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and 
what is clearly one of independent, entrepreneurial dealing. 
Justice Wiley Blount Rutledge 
U.S. Supreme Court 1944
1
 
ABSTRACT 
In most cases, coverage under our nation’s employment laws boils 
down to the question of whether or not the individuals in question are 
“employees” and whether or not the entity in question is an “employer.”  
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 1. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944). 
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Significantly, however, there are burgeoning numbers of cases where 
employer status is found in the absence of a direct relationship to a 
statutory employer.  This Article refers to these entities as quasi-employers 
because they are not employers in the traditional sense, yet they are subject 
to the dictates of employment law legislation. 
This Article reviews the following theories of quasi-employer 
responsibility:  the Sibley Interference Theory, the Spirt Delegation 
Theory, the Joint Employer Theory, and the Single Employer Theory.  This 
Article also reviews the issue of individual supervisory liability as 
employers under the major employment statutes.  Individuals are not 
normally thought of as employers, but they sometimes have a great deal of 
influence over the terms and conditions of employees’ employment.  
Therefore, this Article considers them to be a type of quasi-employer. 
In order to analyze the definitional status of employers and quasi-
employers, it is necessary to examine the definitional status of employees.  
Significantly, however, the law is in a complete state of disarray with 
regard to the definition of employee.  Therefore, it should come as no 
surprise that the definition of employer is also often unclear.  Nevertheless, 
there is a significant body of law that supports treating quasi-employers as 
employers.  Unfortunately, there has not been much scholarship focusing 
on employer status and virtually no academic commentary discussing the 
status of quasi-employers. 
As with employee status, it is important for there to be a clear 
definition of who is an employer so that both employees and employers 
know what their rights and responsibilities are.  The consequences of not 
knowing who ones’ employer is can be fatal to any litigation.  It is also 
important to outline clear criteria because future generations will be 
looking to established case law to determine employer status in work 
environments that may look very different from work environments of 
today. 
It is hoped that this Article contributes to bringing about certainty to, 
in Justice Rutledge’s words, “the borderland” between what is an 
employer-employee relationship and what is not. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The world of work has long been important to individuals as well as to 
society.  Not only does it enable us to provide for our families, but it often 
defines who we are.
2
  Many individuals spend more time at work than with 
their families.  Indeed, Sir William Blackstone referred to work as one of 
the three great relations in private life.
3
 
As this author and others have recognized,  remarkably, there is  no 
clear understanding about how the law should distinguish between 
employees and non-employees whether they are characterized as 
volunteers, independent contractors, or shareholders.
4
  This lack of clarity 
is largely due to the fact that the statutory language defining employee 
status in virtually all of our nation’s employment laws is vague, conclusory, 
and largely useless.
5
 
This Article hopes to bring attention to a related issue, namely, how 
courts should distinguish between who is and who is not an “employer” 
under this country’s labor and employment laws.  Particular attention is 
paid to employers who are, in Justice Rutledge’s words, on the 
 
 2. See Vivian Berger, Respect in Mediation: A Counter to Disrespect in the 
Workplace, 63 DISP. RESOL. J. 18, 18 (2009) (stating that much of our sense of identity, 
worth, and self-respect stems from how well we are doing at work). 
 3. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *422 (“The three great relations in 
private life are, 1. That of master and servant; which is founded in convenience, whereby a 
man is directed to call in the assistance of others, where his own skill and labour will not be 
sufficient to answer the care incumbent upon him. 2. That of husband and wife. . . . [and] 3. 
That of parent and child . . . .”).  In England, the master-servant relationship was the pre-
industrial age analogue to the employer-employee relationship.  Jeffrey E. Dilger, 
Comment, Pay No Attention to the Man Behind the Curtain: Control as a Nonfactor in 
Employee Status Determinations Under FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. 
& EMP. LAW 123, 125 (2010) (discussing origins of the distinction between employee and 
independent contractor). 
 4. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our Nation’s Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected 
Volunteers, 9 U. OF PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147, 158–60 (2006) (discussing the employment 
status of volunteers); see also Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an 
Employee When It Sees One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 295, 296 (2001) (describing statutory definitions of employee status as “baffling”); 
Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of Employee Status:  Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 75, 76–77 (1984) (criticizing the common law test of employee status); 
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Employee or Entrepreneur?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 353 (2011) 
(explaining that the struggle to distinguish between employees and independent contractors 
has been lengthy and confusing). 
 5. The Supreme Court, for example, has referred to the definition of an employee 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act as a “mere ‘nominal definition,’” Clackamas 
Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 444 (2003), and has stated that the 
definition of an employee under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act is 
“completely circular and explains nothing,” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 
318, 323 (1992).   
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“borderland” between being an employer and a non-employer.
6
  This 
Article examines a category of these putative employers referred to as 
quasi-employers.  However, in order to examine these non-traditional 
employers, the definition of employer with respect to traditional employers 
must first be examined.  This Article demonstrates that, like courts trying to 
distinguish between employees and non-employees, the definition of 
“employer” is often vague and inconsistent. 
This is not helpful for anyone.  Both employees and employers need to 
be able to determine what rights they do or do not have.  When 
employment status is unclear, employment rights are unclear.  Uncertainty 
can become a breeding ground for litigation. 
Unlike other areas of law, employers and employees cannot simply 
legislate their status by entering into a contractual agreement declaring that 
the individual in question is or is not an employee of a particular 
employer.
7
  There are, of course, public policy implications by 
characterizing an individual as an employee, which include protection 
under various state and federal employment laws as well as a requirement 
that withholding taxes must be paid.
8
  Indeed, it has been estimated that 
classifying individuals as independent contractors instead of as employees 
might result in a savings of twenty to forty percent of labor costs.
9
 
In any event, at some level one can understand the struggle modern-
day courts are having with employees and employers at the margins.  Most 
 
 6. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944). 
 7. See, e.g., Narayan v EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895, 903–04 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
a contractual agreement which purports to declare that an individual is an independent 
contractor and not an employee is not dispositive); accord, Schwieger v. Farm Bureau Ins. 
Co. of Neb., 207 F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2000); Feldmann v. New York Life Ins. Co., No. 
4:09-CV-2129-MLM, 2011 WL 672647 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 17, 2011); In re O’Connor, 67 
A.D.3d 1302, 1303, 890 N.Y.S.2d 663, 664 (2009) (holding the same under New York 
Unemployment Insurance Law); S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 256 
Cal. Rptr. 543, 547 (Cal. 1989) (“The label placed by the parties on their relationship is not 
dispositive, and subterfuges are not countenanced.”). 
  The fact that a contract designates that an individual is an independent contractor 
may however, be entitled to some weight in making the determination whether the 
individual in question is in fact an employee.  See generally Nat’l Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 
273 F.2d 402, 406 (7th Cir. 1960) (explaining that the contractual designation of an 
individual as an independent contractor is indicative of the intentions of the parties); NLRB 
v. A. S. Abell Co., 327 F.2d 1, 6–7 (4th Cir. 1964) (finding that an agreement stating that an 
individual is not an employee is of some importance, but not controlling); accord, Brown v. 
J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F. 3d 175 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that an independent contractor agreement, 
while not dispositive, is strong evidence of independent contractor status).  But see Fortune 
v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 465 S.E.2d 698, 700 (Ga. App. 1995) (stating under Georgia 
law independent contractor agreements are presumed to be valid). 
 8. See, e.g., Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that 
employee status is of crucial significance in determining applicability of Title VII). 
 9. Jenna Amato Moran, Note, Independent Contractor or Employee? Misclassification 
of Workers and Its Effect on the State, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 105, 121 (2010). 
RUBINSTEIN_FINALIZEDONE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2012  11:22 AM 
610 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:3 
 
of our labor and employment laws were drafted with the notion of full time 
traditional employment in mind, which is often no longer the case.
10
  More 
fundamentally, the definition of “employee” that employer status is heavily 
dependent upon, developed from common law tort principles involving 
vicarious liability of employers—not employment law dogma.
11
 
This confusion, however, may also be due to the fact that courts have 
not paid enough attention to analyzing the case law.  In defining employer 
status, many courts simply focus on the definition of employee and only 
pay lip service to the definition of employer.
12
  Thus, it should come as no 
surprise that litigation has ensued with respect to employers who are in the 
borderland.
13
  What is surprising is that there is a paucity of academic 
scholarship focusing on employer status. 
On the other hand, perhaps the confusion is simply an inherent part of 
our common law system.  The Supreme Court recognized more than seven 
decades ago that social legislation, such as the National Labor Relations 
Act,
14
 is not subject to a mathematical formula and “seldom attains more 
than approximate precision of definition.”
15
  Most, if not all, employment 
laws are a product of social legislation. 
Whatever the cause, in defining employee and employer status, most 
cases are obvious and courts have little difficulty in distinguishing between 
employees and non-employees and therefore, between employers and non-
employers.
16
  However, the employer status of what I call quasi-employers 
is not obvious and is the product of much litigation. 
 
 10. Deanne M. Mosley & William C. Walter, The Significance of the Classification of 
Employment Relationships in Determining Exposure to Liability, 67 MISS. L.J. 613, 613 
(1998) (“The ever increasing intervention of the federal government into the labor arena has 
provided incentives for employers to restructure their work forces so that they employ fewer 
full-time employees and more part-time or temporary employees and/or independent 
contractors.”). 
 11. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. at 120 n.19 (explaining that the common law 
definition of employee evolved from tort principles involving vicarious liability); see also 
Michael C. Harper, Defining the Economic Relationship Appropriate for Collective 
Bargaining, 39 B.C.L. REV. 329, 334 (1998) (reviewing the development of the common 
law definition of an employee). 
 12. See infra notes 157–64 and accompanying text. 
 13. The definitions of employee and employer are not only of significance to labor and 
employment law.  They are also critical in determining tort liability, as well as tax liability.  
Mosley, supra note 10, at 628; see also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. U.S., 
131 S.Ct. 704, 714–16 (2011) (upholding tax regulations that provide that individuals 
scheduled to normally work forty or more hours per week are not exempt as students who 
perform work as an incident to pursuing a course of study); Schramm v. Comm’r of Internal 
Revenue, T.C. Memo., No. 8938-09 (T.C. Aug. 30, 2011) (holding that an adjunct professor 
who taught an online class was not an independent contractor for tax purposes). 
 14. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006). 
 15. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185 (1941). 
 16. JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 2260 (5th ed. 2006). 
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Quasi-employers are not employers in the traditional sense; however, 
the law considers them to be employers because they may significantly 
interfere with an employment relationship, may have been delegated a 
significant amount of responsibility with respect to terms and conditions of 
employment, may be joint or single employers, or otherwise have effective 
control over employees. 
In defining employment relationships, the Supreme Court has long 
recognized that it is appropriate for a court construing one employment 
statute, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), to look to other 
employment law statutes, such as the NLRA, for guidance.
17
  This Article 
follows that same path by discussing employment laws in general and not 
focusing in on any particular employment law statute.
18
 
Before employer status can be examined, it is first necessary to 
understand employee status.  Therefore, Part II of this Article examines the 
 
 17. See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 723 (1947)  
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 . . . is a part of the social legislation of 
the 1930’s of the same general character as the National Labor Relations Act . . 
. and the Social Security Act . . . . Decisions that define the coverage of the 
employer-employee relationship under the Labor and Social Security acts are 
persuasive in the consideration of a similar coverage under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. 
  Because most employment statutes define employee and employer status with virtually 
identical language, several courts have indicated that it is appropriate to look to various 
employment law cases under other employment law statutes for guidance.  See e.g., 
Dellinger v. Science Applications, Int’l Corp., 649 F.3d 226, 231(4th Cir. 2011) (King, J., 
dissenting) (stating that it is appropriate to interpret FLSA in the same manner as Supreme 
Court did under Title VII); Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., No. 06-CV-1495, 
2009 WL 3602008 at *5 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 2780927, No. 09-4498 
(3d Cir. 2010) (stating that the court interprets the term “employee” in the same manner 
under Title VII, FLSA and state human rights law). 
  However, it is not always appropriate to assume that all employment statutes will be 
interpreted in exactly the same manner.  See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv. Inc., 129 S.Ct. 
2343, 2348–49 (2009) (explaining that Title VII has a materially different burden of 
persuasion than the ADEA); Dellinger, 649 F.3d at 227 (holding that FLSA anti-retaliation 
provision does not apply to job applicants and court refused to follow case law holding to 
the contrary under Title VII, the NLRA, and OSHA). 
 18. It should be noted that neither employee nor employer status is required for 
coverage under certain anti-discrimination statutes, see, e.g., Danco, Inc. v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 178 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1999) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981, an anti-discrimination 
statute, in a non-employment case), or for coverage under the First Amendment, see, e.g., 
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 673 (1996) (holding that independent 
contractors are protected from retaliation under the First Amendment). 
  Additionally, the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) 
(2006), authorizes the Secretary of Labor to enjoin the sale of so called “hot goods” which 
were produced in violation of that statute without considering whether or not the individuals 
are employees.  See Timothy P. Glynn, Taking The Employer Out of Employment Law? 
Accountability for Wage and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 201, 219–24 (2011) (discussing the FLSA hot goods provision). 
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differing definitions of “employee” that have been utilized by courts in 
labor and employment cases.  In this section, the Common Law Test, the 
Common Law Entrepreneurial Test, Statutory or Primary Purpose Test, 
Economic Realities Test and the Hybrid Test are each separately examined.  
In Part III, this Article then turns to a discussion of employer status that is 
heavily dependent on cases concerning employee status.  Part IV then 
discusses “quasi-employers.”  Quasi-employers are liable as employers 
under employment law, but their status is not obvious because they do not 
easily fit into the definition of an employer.  A quasi-employer relationship 
can be found under a variety of legal theories which this Article then 
discusses in seriatim:  Sibley Interference Theory, Spirt Delegation Theory, 
Contractor Employees and Third-Party Employers, Joint Employer Theory, 
and Single Employer Theory.  Additionally, under certain employment 
statutes, individual supervisors can be held personally liable because they 
are considered to be a type of quasi-employer and this issue is discussed at 
the end of Part IV.  Part V concludes by explaining that holding quasi-
employers responsible for compliance with this nation’s labor and 
employment laws is analogous to other principles of labor and employment 
and, therefore, legally appropriate.  This Article then summarizes 
applicable law and makes a call for uniformity with respect to this 
important area of law. 
II. WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE? 
In order to understand the legal issues surrounding employee status, it 
is necessary to first examine and define the term “employee.”  
Unfortunately, that has proven difficult to do as there is not a single 
accepted test for employee status.
19
  This is largely because the terms 
“employee”
20
 and “employer”
21
 are not well-defined in most of our nation’s 
 
 19. See FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating 
that the determination of employee status is not subject to a bright line test and is “a long-
recognized rub”); Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971, 975 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(indicating that the threshold question of who is an employee is “a recurring question”); 
Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”: The Case For 
Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws To Include Independent Contractors, 
38 B.C. L. REV. 239, 243 (1997) (noting that the distinction between independent 
contractors and employees remains unsettled). 
 20. The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), states that the term “employee” shall 
be defined as “includ[ing] any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a 
particular employer . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006).  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 
VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2006), and The Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 29 
U.S.C. § 1211(4), define an employee as “an individual employed by an employer . . . .”  
Similarly, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 630(f), and 
the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) define 
an employee as “any individual employed by an employer . . .”  FLSA defines an 
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employment laws, and as a result a significant amount of litigation has been 
generated which attempts to clarify what these terms mean.
22
  The lack of 
statutory and judicial clarity has no doubt contributed to the problem of 
misclassification. 
The problem of employee misclassification is particularly acute.  
While it is difficult to quantify just how widespread this problem is, a 
scholarly study looking at New York State estimated that 10.3% of private-
sector workers were misclassified each year.
23
  In Maine, another scholarly 
study found that 14% of construction employers misclassify workers as 
independent contractors and 11% of Maine employers under report wages 
and unemployment compensation tax liability.
24
  A  U.S. Department of 
Labor study indicated that between 10% and 30% of audited employers 
misclassify their employees.
25
  Indeed, as this Article goes to print, the 
 
“employee” as “any individual employed by an employer” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1), but it also 
defines “employ” as “to suffer or permit work.”  Id. at § 203(g).  The Family and Medical 
Leave Act (“FMLA”), expressly incorporates the FLSA definition of employee.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 2611 (3). 
 21. The NLRA defines an employer simply as “any person acting as an agent of an 
employer, directly or indirectly . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).  Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2003(b), 
and the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(4) defines an “employer” as “a person engaged in an 
industry effecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a 
person . . . .”  The ADEA defines an employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting 
commerce who has twenty or more employees . . . .”  29 U.S.C. § 630(b).  ERISA defines 
an employer as “any person acting directly as an employer, or indirectly in the interest of an 
employer . . . .”  29 U.S.C. § 1002(5).  The FLSA defines employer as “any person acting 
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 
202(d).  The FMLA defines employer as “any person engage in commerce or in any 
industry or activity affecting commerce who employs fifty or employees . . . .”  29 U.S.C. § 
2611(4). 
 22. It should be noted that to be covered under federal employment laws, an employer 
must also be engaged in a certain volume of “interstate commerce.”  Katherine V. W. Stone, 
Legal Protections For Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers Without 
Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 259 
(2006); see, e.g., Vega v. Peninsula Household Services, Inc., No. C-08-03815 JCS, 2009 
WL 656291, at *4 (N.D. Ca 2009) (FLSA case). 
 23. LINDA H. DONAHUE, JAMES R. LAMARE & FRED B. KOTLER, THE COST OF WORKER 
MISCLASSIFICATION IN NEW YORK STATE 5 (2007). See also M. PATRICIA SMITH, JENNIFER S. 
BRAND, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JOINT ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEE 
MISCLASSIFICATION (2009) (discussing problem of worker misclassification under New 
York law). 
 24. ELAINE BERNARD & ROBERT HERRICK, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF 
EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION IN MAINE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 1–2 (2005). 
 25. In August 2009, the federal government released a report highlighting the extent of 
the problem of worker misclassification.  The IRS last did a study of worker 
misclassification in 1984 and concluded that about fifteen percent of the workforce was 
misclassified.  Additionally, a 2000 U.S. Department of Labor study concluded that between 
ten and thirty percent of the firms audited had misclassified employees as independent 
contractors.  The IRS is expected to issue an updated report on the extent of employee 
misclassification in 2013.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-717, EMPLOYEE 
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Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) as well as the U.S. Department of Labor 
are increasingly auditing employers with respect to the issue of worker 
classification.
26
 
Both the U.S. Department of Labor and several state legislatures have 
begun to pay greater attention to the problem of employee 
misclassification.
27
  Indeed, in 2009 President Obama created a Middle 
Class Task Force headed by Vice President Biden to detect and remedy the 
problem of worker misclassification.
28
  As part of that initiative, on 
September 19, 2011, the IRS and the U.S. Department of Labor as well as 
seven states entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to share 
information and other materials and to coordinate law enforcement 
activities designed to reduce worker misclassification.
29
 
 
MISCLASSIFICATION: IMPROVED COORDINATION, OUTREACH, AND TARGETING COULD BETTER 
ENSURE DETECTION AND PREVENTION 10–14 (2009) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE 
MISCLASSIFICATION]. 
 26. See Susan A. Berson, IRS Gets Class Conscious: Switching To Independent 
Contractors Draws Scrutiny, 97 A.B.A. J. 27 (2011) (stating that during 2011–2014, the IRS 
plans to increase random audits of employers and that the Department of Labor has 
increased its auditing activity as well). 
 27. See, e.g., Bran Noonan, The Campaign Against Employee Misclassification, 82 
N.Y.S. Bar. J. 42, 47 (2010) (noting that because of the problem of worker misclassification, 
legislation has been proposed in New York which would utilize a single unified test of 
employee status).  Indeed, during a 2011 New York State Bar Association Conference 
sponsored by the Section of Labor and Employment Law, the problem of worker 
misclassification was described as the issue of the year.  Sharon P. Stiller, Worker 
Misclassification Issues In New York, at 1 (N.Y.S. Bar Assoc. Labor and Employment Law 
Section Annual Meeting Jan. 28, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
In October of 2011, California passed legislation that subjects employers to civil penalty and 
government contractors to debarment if they willfully misclassify individuals as 
independent contractors.  Chapter 706, to be codified at CALIF. LAB. CODE § 226.8 
(approved Oct. 9, 2011).  California also made a person who knowingly advises an 
employer to treat an individual as an independent contractor, to avoid a finding of employee 
status, jointly and severally liable with the employer.  Id. at § 2753(a). 
 28. Press Release, White House Announces Middle Class Task Force (Jan. 30, 2009). 
 29. See WHD News Release 11-1373-NAT, Labor Secretary, IRS Commissioner Sign 
Memorandum of Understanding to Improve Agencies’ Coordination on Employee 
Misclassification Compliance and Education (Sept. 19, 2011).  Deputy Secretary of Labor 
Seth Harris explained the significance of the problem of worker misclassification in his 
testimony before Congress: 
“Misclassification” seems to suggest a technical violation or a paperwork error.  
But “worker misclassification” actually describes workers being illegally 
deprived of labor and employment law protections, as well as public benefits 
programs like unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation because 
such programs generally apply only to “employees” rather than workers in 
general. . . .  Misclassification is no mere technical violation.  It is a serious 
threat to workers and the fair application of the laws Congress has enacted to 
assure workers have good, safe jobs. 
Leveling the Playing Field: Protecting Workers and Businesses Affected by 
Misclassification Before the S. Comm. On Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 111th 
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It is somewhat surprising that before these recent developments, the 
problem of employee and employer misclassification has not received more 
legislative and political attention.  Indeed, the distinction between 
employee and independent contractor, which generates the most litigation, 
is by no means a new phenomenon and actually dates back to Roman law.
30
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized almost seven decades ago 
that “[f]ew problems in the law have given greater variety of application 
and conflict in results than the cases arising in the borderland between what 
is clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of 
independent, entrepreneurial dealing.”
31
  While that particular court case 
dealt with the status of independent contractors,
32
 the situation is no less 
confusing when courts try to define the line between employers and non-
employers or between employees and non-employees, such as volunteers
33
 
and retirees.
34
 
On some level the ambiguity and confusion over employee status is 
understandable, at least with respect to some employers.  There is, of 
course, a great variety of workplaces.  Employers as a group are in business 
to earn a profit.  As such, many want to maintain a maximum amount of 
discretion over the terms and conditions of employment of their workers.  
Therefore, some employers may desire to maintain control, which is a 
major factor in any analysis of employee status.  Others may, of course, be 
engaging in purposeful manipulation in order to avoid a finding of 
employee status at all costs.
35
 
Maximization of the right of control makes it more likely that the 
workers in question are employees.  Most employees are entitled to 
protection under employment and labor law statutes, including the NLRA, 
and its prospect for unionization.
36
  Thus, some employers may purposely 
 
Cong. (2010) (statement of Seth Harris, Deputy Sec’y of Labor). 
 30. KENNETH G. DAU-SCHMIDT, ROBERT N. COVINGTON & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, LEGAL 
PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE 41 (4th ed. 2010). 
 31. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944) (footnote omitted). 
 32. Since its enactment in 1935, the NLRA has lacked clarity with respect to employee 
classification.  Micah Prieb Stoltzfus Jost, Note, Independent Contractors, Employees And 
Entrepreneurialism Under The National Labor Relations Act: A Worker-By-Worker 
Approach, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311, 317 (2011). 
 33. I have previously explained that it is important to distinguish between volunteers 
and employees because most of our nation’s employment laws only apply to employees.  
Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 150. 
 34. Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 
404 U.S. 157, 166 (1971) (holding retired persons are not employees under the NLRA). 
 35. On Oct. 11, 2011, California made it unlawful for a person to knowingly advise an 
employer to misclassify an individual as an independent contractor.  Interestingly, attorneys 
are exempt from the reach of this statute.  See Chapter 706, codified at CAL. LAB. CODE. § 
2753 (approved Oct. 9, 2011). 
 36. 29 U.S.C. § 151–52. 
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seek to place their workers in a zone of ambiguity in order to give them the 
ability to argue against employee status while maintaining a modem of 
control.
37
 
Despite the ambiguity that is often in play in these types of cases, 
courts must often draw lines because they simply do not have jurisdiction if 
the individual in question is not an employee.
38
  Without the counting of the 
putative employee, the corporation at issue might not meet the statute’s 
numerosity requirement necessary to being considered an employer.
39
  The 
consequences of finding that an individual is not an employee are also 
significant to the individual as they may not be eligible for a public 
pension,
40
 collective bargaining,
41
 or protection by employment laws.
42
 
In most instances, mere misclassification of an employee is not 
unlawful.
43
  California, however, recently enacted a statute which makes it 
unlawful to willfully misclassify an individual as an independent 
contractor.
44
  Otherwise, worker misclassification merely leads to a finding 
 
 37. Jost, supra note 32, at 315 (stating that given the lack of clarity in the law, some 
employers may manipulate work relationships or deliberately and illegally misclassify 
workers). 
 38. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating that 
the line between who is an employee and who is an independent contractor under the NLRA 
is jurisdictional because the NLRB does not have jurisdiction over independent contractors); 
Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., No. 07-0859, 2008 WL 2129887, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 20, 2008), 
aff’d. in part and rev’d. in part, 581 F.3d 175 (3d. Cir. 2009) (same under Title VII). 
 39. See infra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing numerosity in employment 
law). 
 40. See, e.g., Scheurer v. N.Y.C. Emps. Ret. Sys., 636 N.Y.S.2d 291, 292 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1996) (finding that a hearing examiner is not an employee of the City and therefore, not 
entitled to retirement system membership). 
 41. See, e.g., Levitt v. Bd. of Certification of the Office of Collective Bargaining, 710 
N.Y.S.2d 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (holding that hearing officers who are not employees 
are not eligible for collective bargaining under Civil Service Law); Brown Univ., 342 
N.L.R.B. 483 (2004) (finding that graduate students are not employees under the National 
Labor Relations Act and therefore, NLRB dismisses union election petition).  The NLRB 
has indicated that it is going to review Brown.  N.Y. Univ., 356 NLRB No. 7, slip op. at 2 
(Oct. 25, 2010). 
 42. Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 509 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(holding that the ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating against employees and 
does not cover claims brought by independent contractors); Cleveland v. City of Elmendorf, 
388 F.3d 522, 529 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that unpaid police officers are not subject to 
FLSA as they are not employees and dismissing the FLSA claim); Tadros v. Coleman, 717 
F. Supp. 996, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff’d, 898 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that a 
volunteer doctor is not an employee in dismissing the Title VII employment discrimination 
claim).  Accord, Richard Bales & Lindsay Mongenas, Defining Independent Contractor 
Protection Under the Rehabilitation Act, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 435 (2011) (discussing 
whether independent contractors are protected from discrimination under the Rehabilitation 
Act).  
 43. EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION, supra note 25, at 7.  
 44. Act of Oct. 9, 2011, 2011 Cal. Stat. ch. 706, (to be codified at CAL. LAB. CODE. § 
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that a particular employment law was violated.  For example, if the 
employer does not comply with the Family and Medical Leave Act, it will 
be found to have violated that statute by not applying it to the employee in 
question.
45
 
Remarkably, some courts have assumed that the definition of an 
employee is uniform across federal law.
46
  That is simply wrong.  At least 
four well-established definitions exist:  the common law agency test, the 
primary or statutory purpose test, the economy reality test, and a hybrid 
combination of the common law and economic reality tests.  A fifth may be 
emerging, which this Article defines as the “common law entrepreneurial 
test.”
47
  This Article now turns to a discussion of those tests. 
A. Common Law Agency Test 
The starting point for most employee status analysis cases
48
 is the 
“common law right to control” test, which may be considered simplistic, 
but in reality is quite difficult to apply.
49
  Under the common law, labels 
placed on employees, are not controlling and the entire circumstances must 
be examined.
50
  One Title VII case illustrative of this standard is Salamon 
v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp.
51
  In Salamon, the Second Circuit held that 
the common law agency test should be the default standard.  The court 
reached this result by looking to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden,
52
 in which the Court 
 
226.8).  Employers who violate this statute could be subject to a civil penalty and in 
addition, governmental contractors could be subject to disbarment. 
 45. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2006) (prohibiting 
interference with rights provided under the Act). 
 46. See, e.g., Fichman v. Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008) (illustrating 
the understanding of some courts that the definition of employee is uniform federally). 
 47. See supra notes 66–85 and accompanying text; Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 161. 
Some courts have also noted that there is little difference between the common law test and 
the hybrid test.  Id. at 168–69; see also Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(indicating that hybrid test is not materially different from common law test). 
 48. See Langfitt v. Fed. Marine Terminals, Inc., 647 F.3d 1116, 1121 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(stating that “[o]ne of the foremost status distinctions at common law is that between an 
employee and an independent contractor.”). 
 49. Mosley, supra note 10, at 632 (stating that the common law test is “rather 
simplistic”). 
 50. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 729 (1947) (“Where the 
work done, in its essence, follows the usual path of an employee, putting on an ‘independent 
contractor’ label does not take the worker from the protection of the Act.”); see also FedEx 
Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (stating that there is no magic 
phrase to be applied and all incidents of the relationship must be examined under the 
common law standard). 
 51. Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., No. 06-1707-cv, 2008 WL 2609712, at 
*1061 (2d Cir. Jan. 16, 2008). 
 52. 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
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held that the common law standard was the appropriate one to use where a 
statute fails to specifically define “employee.”
53
 
The circuit court summarized the common law right to control test by 
quoting the factors examined in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid.
54
  Those factors are as follows: 
1 the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by 
which the product is accomplished; . . . 2 the skill required; 3 the 
source of the instrumentalities and tools; 4 the location of the 
work; 5 the duration of the relationship between the parties; 6 
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects 
to the hired party; 7 the extent of the hired party’s discretion over 
when and how long to work; 8 the method of payment; 9 the 
hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; 10 whether the 
work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; 11 
whether the hiring party is in business; 12 the provision of 
employee benefits; 13 and the tax treatment of the hired party.
55
 
These Reid factors are non-exhaustive and other factors may be 
considered.  While these factors are not to be applied in a “mechanistic 
fashion,” special weight is given to the control of the manner and means by 
which assigned tasks are completed.
56
 
In a footnote, Salamon added that, prior to even analyzing the Reid 
factors, a plaintiff must have received some form of remuneration to 
establish that he or she was hired.
57
  I have addressed the remuneration 
issue elsewhere and referred to the test of employee status as involving a 
two-step inquiry:  whether a hiring took place (which generally requires 
remuneration) and whether the common law agency standards as reflected 
in Reid are satisfied.
58
  The law is still developing with respect to whether 
or not the first factor, which requires a hiring, is a necessary part of the test 
for employee status.
59
 
Outside cases involving volunteers, there is usually no issue with 
respect to whether a hiring took place or whether remuneration is received.  
 
 53. Salamon, 2008 WL 2609712, at *1060. 
 54. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989). 
 55. Salamon, 2008 WL 2609712, at *1061 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751–52); see also 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 322–24 (adopting Reid factors to determine whether individual was 
employee under ERISA). 
 56. Salamon, 2008 WL 2609712, at *1061 (citing numerous authorities).  But see 
FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 503 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (putting special weight 
on the possibility of entrepreneurial opportunity). 
 57. Salamon, 2008 WL 2609712, at *1061 n.10. 
 58. Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 175–79. 
 59. Compare O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115–16 (2d Cir. 1997) (adopting two-
factor test) with Bryson Middlefield Volunteer Fire Dep’t, Inc., 656 F. 3d 348, 352–56 (6th 
Cir. 2011) (rejecting two-factor test).  See also Junino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 
No. 11-466, 2012 WL 527972 (M.D. La. Feb. 14, 2012) (discussing conflicting case law). 
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Therefore, whether or not this two-factor test applies is immaterial to the 
vast majority of U.S. employers. 
In addition to most Title VII cases
60
 and ERISA cases,
61
 the common 
law test is utilized in NLRB cases,
62
 cases under the Uniform Services 
Employment and Reemployment Act,
63
 and other employment law statutes, 
including many state employment laws.
64
 
1. Common Law Entrepreneurial Control Test 
There is some support for the possible development of another test of 
employee status (or at least another aspect of the common law right to 
control test) that can be called the “common law entrepreneurial control 
test.”
65
 
The Restatement (Third) of Employment Law
66
 links the definition of 
independent business, which is crucial in analyzing whether or not an 
 
 60. In Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202 (1997), the Supreme Court 
arguably approved of the common law test in Title VII cases. 
 61. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). 
 62. The Arizona Republic, 349 N.L.R.B. 1040 (2007) (noting that news carriers are 
independent contractors).  An interesting twist to this case is that it generated a strong 
dissent from former NLRB Member Wilma Liebman, in which she factored into the 
equation the economic dependence of the putative employee.  It appears that Liebman 
would adopt a type of hybrid test for employee status, as utilized in many cases under Title 
VII, where the common law test is combined with the economic reality test (in which the 
focus is on economic dependence). 
  Query as to whether Liebman’s dissent is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
adoption of the common law test of employee status in NLRB cases.  See NLRB v. United 
Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968) (reviewing definition of employee under 
NLRA); Anne Marie Lofaso, The Vanishing Employee: Putting the Autonomous Dignified 
Union Worker Back to Work, 5 F.I.U. L. REV. 495 (2010) (examining the definition of 
employee).  In any event, the NLRB continues to apply the common law test.  Lancaster 
Symphony Orchestra, 357 NLRB No. 152 (Dec. 27, 2011). 
 63. Evans v. Massmutual Fin. Grp., No. 09-CV-6028 CJS, 2009 WL 3614534 
(W.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2009) (applying common law test of employee status under this statute). 
 64. See, e.g., In re Concourse Ophthalmology Assocs., P.C., 456 N.E.2d 1201, 1201 
(N.Y. 1983); Matter of Viig v. Comm’r of Labor, 886 N.Y.S.2d 246 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
 65. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 18–19 (3d ed. 2008) (raising the question of whether entrepreneurial 
control test differs from common law agency test); see also Dilger, supra note 3, at 124 
(stating that common law right to control test has been replaced with test of entrepreneurial 
opportunity). 
 66. On May 19, 2009, the Restatement (Third) of Employment Law was adopted by the 
American Law Institute, subject to additional discussion and editorial prerogative. 86th 
Annual Meeting, ALI.ORG, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=meetings.annual_ 
updates_09 (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2011).  It is important to note, however, the Restatement of Law 
Third Employment Law has not been adopted by any jurisdiction. 
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individual is an employee, to entrepreneurial control.
67
  The Comment to 
the Restatement explains that the right to control inquiry is only part of the 
common law analysis, in that “the more fundamental question of whether 
the service provider has entrepreneurial discretion to operate an 
independent business.”
68
 
FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB
69
 is the leading case involving 
entrepreneurial opportunity as a factor in determining employee status.  In 
FedEx, the D.C. Circuit faced the issue of whether drivers are independent 
contractors.  The court held that in determining whether the individuals in 
question were independent contractors under the NLRA common law right 
to control test, courts should examine whether “the position presents the 
opportunities and risks inherent in entrepreneurialism.”
70
  The majority did 
not view this as a new test for employee status, but instead relied on an 
earlier decision which indicated that the court and NLRB shifted emphasis 
away from the right to control inquiry toward “a more accurate proxy.”
71
  
That proxy is whether the individuals in question have a significant 
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.
72
  In finding the drivers to be 
independent contractors, the majority indicated that it considered all the 
common law factors and balanced them.
73
  Thus, the majority was 
attempting to apply the common law right to control test, at least on paper. 
By contrast, the dissent stated that the majority’s shift in emphasis to 
entrepreneurial opportunity amounted to a new test for employee status.  
The dissent indicated that the majority’s determination was contrary to 
existing law.  It criticized the majority’s adoption of a new standard based 
on a single instance of entrepreneurial opportunity possibly being enough 
to defeat employee status.
74
 
Professor Jeffrey M. Hirsch has questioned whether the focus on 
entrepreneurial opportunity is the start of a new test.  He has cautioned that 
 
 67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01(2)–(3). 
 68. Id. at § 1.01 cmt. d (citing Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 
(D.C. Cir. 2002)) (stating that the critical distinction between employee and independent 
contractor is “the degree to which each functions as an entrepreneur-that is, takes economic 
risk and has the corresponding opportunity to profit from working smarter, not just 
harder.”); NLRB v. Friendly Cab Co., 512 F.3d 1090, 1097–99 (9th Cir. 2008) (placing 
particular significance on the fact that drivers cannot engage in entrepreneurial opportunities 
and that they lack a substantial investment in property); see also Estrada v. FedEx Ground 
Package Sys., Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 337 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that drivers are 
employees because they do not have a separate business and are not given a “true 
entrepreneurial opportunity”). 
 69. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 70. Id. at 497 (citation omitted). 
 71. Id. at 497. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 504 (Garland, J., dissenting). 
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by focusing on entrepreneurial “opportunity,” as opposed to actual 
engagement, this standard is subject to abuse by employers who may adopt 
policies expressly accounting for putative independent contractors’ 
“entrepreneurial opportunities,” even though those opportunities may only 
exist on paper.
75
   
Any test, however, is subject to manipulation by employers who can 
structure a putative job to either facilitate or avoid a finding of employee 
status.
76
  I have previously questioned whether this “entrepreneurial 
opportunity” standard was a new test and concluded that was simply an 
offshoot of the common law test.
77
  In FedEx, the D.C. Circuit expressly 
stated that it was retaining the common law test and simply focusing the 
inquiry on entrepreneurialism.
78
  That holding is reasonable and justified 
because the common law test itself does not consist of rigid factors set in 
stone.
79
  Stated another way, entrepreneurial opportunity is simply another 
factor that can be examined under the common law standard. 
More fundamentally, because the Supreme Court in United Insurance 
held that the common law test was applicable under the NLRA, the NLRB 
and lower federal courts could not simply abandon this standard.
80
  While 
 
 75. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, New “Entrepreneurial Opportunity” Test for Independent 
Contractor Status?, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG (Apr. 22, 2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad 
.com/laborprof_blog/2009/week17/index.html; Hirsch, supra note 4, at 355; but see, Dilger, 
supra note 3, at 148–49 (2010) (concluding that entrepreneurial opportunity is a new test of 
employee status which has the potential to change the legal landscape because of the ability 
of NLRB cases to be reviewed in the D.C. Circuit). 
 76. See Noah D. Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Tackling the Independent Contractor 
Problem Without Redefining Employment, 26 ABA J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 279, 282–83 (2011) 
(explaining that employers have the power to shape business practices to avoid unionization 
by classifying individuals as independent contractors); David Millon, Keeping Hope Alive, 
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 369, 370 (2011) (same); see also Glynn, supra note 18, at 104 
(2011) (explaining that in order to reduce employment law liability exposure, employers 
may shift work to third parties). 
 77. Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 161 n.69 (2006). 
 78. FedEx, 563 F.3d at 497. 
 79. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992) (quoting NLRB 
v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968)) (stating that since the common 
law test contains “no shorthand formula or magic phrase that can be applied to find the 
answer [with respect to the definition of an employee], . . . all of the incidents of the 
relationship must be assessed and weighed with no one factor being decisive.”); Salamon, 
2008 WL 2609712, at *1060 (same). 
  In section 220(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958), which outlined the 
factors courts should examine in determining whether or not an individual is an employee, it 
was recognized that those factors were not the only ones that could be considered.  The 
Restatement of Agency standard is essentially the same common law standard adopted by 
the Supreme Court in Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 
(1989) and Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 503 U.S. at 323–24.  The Restatement of Agency was 
the closest analogy to employment law before the adoption of the Restatement of 
Employment. 
 80. NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 256 (1968). 
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none of the more recent Supreme Court decisions on employee status 
discuss the issue of entrepreneurialism, language can be found in United 
Insurance to support the propriety of entrepreneurialism as a factor in the 
common law analysis.  Specifically, the Court stated in United Insurance 
that “[o]n the other hand, however, they do not have the independence, nor 
are they allowed the initiative and decision-making authority, normally 
associated with an independent contractor.”
81
  The phrase “initiative and 
decision-making authority” can be read as a suggestion to look at 
entrepreneurial opportunity that a putative independent contractor may 
possess as a factor in the common law analysis. 
There is thin support for concluding that entrepreneurial opportunity 
should be characterized as a new test.  Indeed, it appears that despite the 
D.C. Circuit decision, NLRB decisions are continuing to apply the 
traditional “right to control” test.
82
  In the NLRB’s  recent decision 
concerning independent contractor status, it expressly stated that one of the 
factors in determining independent contractor status was whether or not the 
individual bears an entrepreneurial risk of loss and opportunity for 
entrepreneurial gain.
83
  At most, the issue of entrepreneurial opportunity 
and risk is an additional factor to look at, but not a separate test.
84
 Of 
course, while the above discussion primarily involved NLRB case law, 
there is no reason why the same form of analysis would not apply to other 
areas of employment law. 
B. Statutory or Primary Purpose Test 
The Supreme Court has also looked to the primary purpose of a 
particular employment statute to determine whether or not certain 
individuals should be covered as employees.  The statutory or primary 
purpose test is considered broader than the common law standard.
85
  In 
 
 81. Id. at 258. 
 82. See Dilger, supra note 3, at 124 (citation omitted); see also BWI Taxi Mgmt., Inc., 
NLRB Case No. 5-RC-16489, 2010 WL 4836874 (N.L.R.B. Sept. 16, 2010) (providing 
example of NLRB decision continuing to apply right to control test). 
 83. Lancaster Symphony Orchestra, 357 NLRB No. 152 (Dec. 23, 2011). 
 84. Lancaster Symphony did not cite to FedEx or even discuss the issue of whether or 
not entrepreneurial opportunity involved the application of a new test for independent 
contractor status.  Id.  Additionally, the majority in Lancaster Symphony disagreed with the 
dissent with respect to exactly what constitutes entrepreneurial opportunity.  Id.  
Specifically, the majority held that the fact that the symphony orchestra musicians, whose 
status was at issue in this case, could decide to work more and therefore, earn more, was not 
indicative of entrepreneurial opportunity.  The dissent considered this factor as indicative of 
entrepreneurial opportunity based on the idea that by controlling how much they work, they 
control how much they make.  One can expect additional litigation focused on exactly what 
constitutes entrepreneurial opportunity. 
 85. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 324 (1992). 
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NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., the Court held that independent 
contractors were not excluded from the definition of employee under the 
NLRA.
86
  The Court rejected the common law test because it resulted in 
inconsistent rulings.
87
  The Court explained this test of employee status as 
follows: 
Whether, given the intended national uniformity, the term 
‘employee’ includes such workers as these newsboys must be 
answered primarily from the history, terms and purposes of the 
legislation.  The word ‘is not treated by Congress as a word of art 
having a definite meaning . . . .’  Rather, ‘it takes color from its 
surroundings [in] the statute where it appears,’ and derives 
meaning from the context of that statute, which ‘must be read in 
light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be attained.’
88
 
Significantly, however, in that same decision, the Court indicated that 
in doubtful cases, courts could examine “underlying economic facts” and 
“economic relationships” which blurs the distinction between the primary 
purpose test and what later became known as the economic reality test.
89
 
It is important to note that in 1947, the NLRA was amended to 
exclude independent contractors from the definition of employee.
90
  
However, that does not diminish the importance of the Court’s analysis, 
particularly when one considers the fact that Congress provided little 
guidance with respect to distinguishing between independent contractors 
and employees.
91
 
More recently, and outside the NLRA, the Supreme Court in Robinson 
v. Shell Oil Co., seems to have once again approved of a type of primary 
purpose test.
92
  There, the Court was faced with having to decide whether 
the anti-retaliation provisions in Title VII applied to former employees who 
were given a negative post-employment reference.
93
  In holding that the 
term “employee” applied to former employees, the Court reasoned in part: 
 
 86. 322 U.S. 111, 120 (1944). 
 87. Id. at 123. 
 88. Id. at 124 (citations omitted). 
 89. Id. at 128–29.  Indeed, one scholar has gone so far as to describe the test adopted by 
the Supreme Court in Hearst as an “economic realities” test.  Zatz, supra note 76, at 281. 
 90. 29 U.S.C. § 152 (3) (2006); see NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of America, 390 U.S. 254, 
256 (1968) (discussing this statutory amendment to the definition of employee).  In United 
Insurance, the Court adopted the common law test in defining employee status under the 
NLRA.  Id. 
 91. See Zatz, supra note 76, at 281 (explaining that the NLRA statutory amendments 
did not provide significant guidance with respect to how to draw the line between 
employees and independent contractors). 
 92. 519 U.S. 337 (1997). 
 93. Id. at 339. 
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According to the EEOC, exclusion of former employees from the 
protection of § 704(a) would undermine the effectiveness of Title 
VII by allowing the threat of postemployment retaliation to deter 
victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC, and 
would provide a perverse incentive for employers to fire 
employees who might bring Title VII claims. Those arguments 
carry persuasive force given their coherence and their 
consistency with a primary purpose of antiretaliation provisions: 
Maintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.  
The EEOC quite persuasively maintains that it would be 
destructive of this purpose of the antiretaliation provision for an 
employer to be able to retaliate with impunity against an entire 
class of acts under Title VII—for example, complaints regarding 
discriminatory termination. We agree with these contentions and 
find that they support the inclusive interpretation of ‘employees’ 
in § 704(a) that is already suggested by the broader context of 
Title VII.
94
 
Similarly, in Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, in examining if a 
husband and mother of a restaurant owner were employees for purposes of 
whether the restaurant met the numerical employee threshold, the Seventh 
Circuit relied in part upon the underlying purposes of Title VII.
95
  I have 
previously explained that the NLRB, at times, has looked to the primary 
purpose of the NLRA to determine whether or not certain individuals are 
employees protected under the law.
96
 
In a fairly well-known FLSA case, Judge Easterbrook in a 
concurrence criticized both the common law right to control test and the 
economic reality test as unfocused and unpredictable.
97
  He advocated a 
return to a standard where employee status is determined by examining the 
putative employee responsibilities and comparing that to the underlying 
purposes of the statute.
98
  Thus, Judge Easterbrook essentially advocates for 
the adoption of the statutory purpose test.  This demonstrates that the 
statutory purpose test may still be a relevant consideration in determining 
employment status even if the court is not applying it exclusively. 
 
 94. Id. at 346 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 95. 453 F.3d 971, 985–86 (7th Cir. 2006); see also EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & 
Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Statutory purpose is [a] relevant” factor courts 
could consider in determining whether partners in a large law firm should be treated as 
employees or employers). 
 96. Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 164–65 (2006). 
 97. Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1539–40 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, 
J., concurring). 
 98. Id. 
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C. Economic Realities Test 
By contrast, the economic realities test focuses on “whether the 
employee, as a matter of economic reality, is dependent upon the business 
to which he [or she] renders service.”
99
 
The Supreme Court appears to have adopted this standard in an early 
FLSA case because it approved of the lower court’s statement that the 
common law test did not apply because “the Act concerns itself with the 
correction of economic evils through remedies which were unknown at 
common law . . . [and] the ‘underlying economic realities . . . lead to the 
conclusion that the boners were and are employees of Kaiser . . . .’”
100
  
Given that the Supreme Court did expressly state that it was adopting the 
economic realities test, it is not entirely clear that the Court actually 
intended to adopt a new standard or test.
101
 
In any event, the Supreme Court eventually expressly adopted the 
economic reality test in a case examining whether volunteers were covered 
by the FLSA.
102
  Unfortunately, the Court’s decision did not clearly define 
this standard or provide much guidance with respect to how courts should 
distinguish between employees and non-employees.
103
 
Later, the Fifth Circuit issued a lengthy, well-written opinion where it 
extensively examined and discussed the economic realities test.  The court 
explained that this test involved an examination of the following factors: 
 
 99. Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 100. Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 726–27 (1947) (quoting Walling 
v. Rutherford Food Corp., 156 F.2d 513, 516–17 (10th Cir. 1946)). 
 101. See Stone, supra note 22, at 257 (describing economic realities test and collecting 
authorities). 
 102. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (citations 
omitted). 
 103. Id. at 301.  The Court described this test as follows: 
The test of employment under the Act is one of ‘economic reality’. . . . Whereas 
in Portland Terminal, the training course lasted a little over a week, in this case 
the associates were ‘entirely dependent upon the Foundation for long periods, in 
some cases several years’. .  . .  Under the circumstances, the District Court’s 
finding that the associates must have expected to receive in-kind benefits— and 
expected them in exchange for their services—is certainly not clearly erroneous. 
Under Portland Terminal, a compensation agreement may be ‘implied’ as well 
as ‘express’ . . .and the fact that the compensation was received primarily in the 
form of benefits rather than cash is in this context immaterial. 
Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) (citations 
omitted).  Many lower courts, in turn, have adopted the economic realities test in FLSA 
cases.  See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 335 F.3d 61, 66–67 (2d. Cir. 2003) (applying 
economic reality test in FLSA case); accord, Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am, 545 F.3d 338, 
343 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1635 (2009).  See also Cuddeback v. Fla. Bd. of 
Educ., 381 F.3d 1230, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2004) (adopting economic reality test under Title 
VII). 
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(1) the degree of control exercised by the alleged employer; (2) 
the extent of the relative investments of the worker and the 
alleged employer; (3) the degree to which the worker’s 
opportunity for profit or loss is determined by the alleged 
employer; (4) the skill and initiative required in performing the 
job; and (5) the permanency of the relationship. No single factor 
is determinative. Rather each factor is a tool used to gauge the 
economic dependence of the alleged employee, and each must be 
applied with this ultimate concept in mind.
104
 
The economic realities test has been described by several well-known 
authors in a Casebook as the default test under federal protective legislation 
when the statute gives little guidance with respect to the appropriate test of 
employee status, though there is considerable authority which indicates that 
the common law right to control is the default standard.
105
  In any event, 
this illustrates that this it is important to be aware of this test.   
The economic realities test has been criticized as a “rearticulat[ion] 
and appl[ication of] common law agency principles.”
106
  Indeed, the very 
first factor noted above concerns the right of control which is a central part 
of the common law test.
107
  It should be noted that the economic realities 
test was originally developed to be more expansive than the common law 
test.
108
 
D. Hybrid Test 
The hybrid test combines both the common law and economic realities 
tests and attempts to steer a middle ground.
109
  There has been widespread 
adoption of this test, particularly under Title VII.
110
  However, a number of 
 
 104. Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 343 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also 
Thibault v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc, 612 F.3d 843 (5th Cir. 2010) (following Hopkins); 
Strom v. Strom Closures, Inc., No. 06-C-7051, 2008 WL 4852998, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 
2008) (adopting a multi-factor economic reality test under FLSA and state wage and hour 
statute). 
 105. DAU-SCHMIDT, supra note 30, at 42.  But see Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 
503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (stating in the context of ERISA that the common law standard is 
the default test of employee status where Congress has not spoken) 
 106. Perry v. City of Country Club Hills, 607 F. Supp. 771, 773 n.2 (E.D. Mo. 1983). 
 107. See also Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831–32 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (applying the 
economic realities test to a Title VII case, but the court also states that the right of the 
putative employer to control work is a critical factor). 
 108. MARK ROTHSTEIN, CHARLES B. CRAVER, ELINOR P. SCHROEDER & ELAINE W. 
SHOBEN, 1 EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.3 (3d ed. 2005); see also Darden, 503 U.S. at 326 (noting 
that the FLSA “stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not 
qualify as such under a strict application of traditional agency law principles.”); Hopkins, 
545 F.2d at 343 (stating that the definition of employee under FLSA is particularly broad). 
 109. Mosley, supra note 10, at 636–37. 
 110. Id. at 638.  See, e.g., Muhammad v. Dallas Cnty. Cmty. Supervision, 479 F.3d 377, 
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courts have also rejected the adoption of this test in light of the statement in 
Darden, which indicated that the common law test is the default standard 
where Congress has not specified an appropriate standard.
111
  The use of the 
hybrid test is also questionable under Title VII because in Walters v. 
Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court arguably 
indirectly approved of one of the party’s arguments, which called for the 
adoption of the common law test of agency.
112
  It is by no means entirely 
clear, however, that the Supreme Court actually meant to approve of this 
standard because the Court did not expressly state whether it agreed with 
that part of the argument.
113
  On the other hand, in Robinson v. Shell Oil 
Co., the Court, in a Title VII retaliation case, approved of the primary 
purpose test.
114
   With these caveats in mind, it is important to explain what 
the hybrid test entails as many courts still apply it.  One court described the 
hybrid test as follows: 
In determining whether an employment relationship exists within 
the meaning of Title VII and the ADEA, we apply a ‘hybrid 
economic realities/common law control test.’  The right to 
control an employee’s conduct is the most important component 
of this test. When examining the control component, we have 
focused on whether the alleged employer has the right to hire and 
fire the employee, the right to supervise the employee, and the 
right to set the employee’s work schedule.  The economic 
realities component of our test has focused on whether the 
alleged employer paid the employee’s salary, withheld taxes, 
provided benefits, and set the terms and conditions of 
employment.
115
 
 
380 (5th Cir. 2007) (“To determine whether an employment relationship exists within the 
meaning of Title VII, we apply a hybrid economic realities/common law control test.”) 
(internal citation and quotation omitted); EEOC v. Zippo Mfr., Co., 713 F.2d 32, 37 (3d. 
Cir. 1983) (mentioning the use of hybrid test for Title VII cases); see also Hill v. City of 
Austin Pub. Works, No. A-08-CV-079 LY, 2008 WL 750566, at *2 (W.D. Texas Mar. 19, 
2008) (utilizing the hybrid test to find that workers were not employees of plaintiff-
employer); D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co., 927 A.2d 113, 121 (N.J. 2007) (utilizing 
hybrid test under the state whistleblower statute). 
 111. Stouch v. Bros. of Order of Hermits of St. Augustine, 836 F. Supp. 1134, 1139 
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (“Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court held that in statutes 
where Congress does not helpfully define ‘employee,’ courts should use the common-law 
agency test”) (citation omitted). 
 112. 519 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1997). 
 113. Id. at 212–13.  See also Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69, 84 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(holding that Walters adopted the common law test under Title VII). 
 114. See supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text (discussing Shell Oil and primary 
purpose test). 
 115. Deal v. State Farm Mut. Ins., 5 F.3d 117, 118–19 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations 
omitted); accord, Roque v. Jazz Casino, 388 Fed. Appx. 402 (5th Cir. 2010); see also 
Martin v. UT Southwestern Med. Ctr., 3:07-CV-1663-0, 2009 WL 77871, at *5 (N.D. Tex. 
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In Magallanes v. Penske Logisitcs, the court utilized the hybrid test to 
find that an individual who worked at a company that supplied a truck and 
a truck driver pursuant to a contract with another company was an 
employee of the original company and not the contractor.
116
  This is 
notwithstanding the fact that he was assigned to work at the contracting 
company and the contractor instructed him as to when and where to deliver 
the goods.
117
  Though several elements of control were exercised by the 
contracting company, on balance the court held that he was economically 
dependent on the first company.
118
 
As I have explained elsewhere, it makes no sense, from a public 
policy perspective to have multiple tests for employee status.
119
  Indeed, 
because different statutes and different tests are involved, an individual can 
be an employee for some purposes, but an independent contractor for 
others.
120
  Thus, for example, an employee can be considered an employee 
under the NLRA, but not under other statutes.
121
 
One Circuit, while acknowledging this problem referred to it merely 
as a “semantic inconsistency.”
122
  While I am not exactly sure what the 
court meant by that, I do note that several academic commentators
123
 and 
 
Jan. 12, 2009) (applying the hybrid test in Title VII case); Hathcock v. Acme Truck Lines, 
Inc., 262 F.3d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 928 (2002) (discussing the 
hybrid test).. 
 116. Magallanes v. Penske Logistics LLC, 570 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (W.D. Tex. 2008). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 912–13. 
 119. Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 169–70 (2006). 
 120. Id. at 151 (citing Seattle Opera v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 757, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) 
(holding that an individual was an employee under NLRA even though he was not paid the 
minimum wage and did not receive tax form W-2); see also Hopkins v. Cornerstone Am, 
545 F.3d 338, 347 (5th Cir. 2008) (stating that it is not inconsistent to be considered an 
employee under the FLSA, but an independent contractor under other statutes); City Cab 
Co. of Orlando, 285 N.L.R.B. 1191, 1193 (1987) (holding that employee status 
determinations of other governmental agencies are not controlling, but should be given 
consideration by the NLRB).  But see Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C.,  No. 
06-CV-1495, 2009 WL 3602008 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009), aff’d, 2010 WL 2780927, No. 
09-4498 (3d Cir. July 15, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 925 (2011) (noting that all parties 
agreed that Title VII, the FLSA, and state human rights law should be similarly interpreted 
with respect to employee and employer status). 
 121. This does not happen often, but it does happen.  See BWI Taxi Mgmt, No. 5-RC-
4836874, 2010 WL 4836874, at *9 n.15 (NLRB Reg. Dir. Sept. 16, 2010) (stating that the 
petitioner received a letter saying he was an independent contractor under the EEOC, but 
was considered an employee under the NLRA); Seattle Opera, 292 F.3d at 761–62 (holding 
individual was an employee even though he was treated as an independent contractor for tax 
purposes in that he did not receive a W-2 tax form). 
 122. Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 347. 
 123. Jeff Clement, Lerohl v. Friends of Minnesota Sinfonia: An Out Of Tune Definition 
of “Employee” Keeps Freelance Musicians From Being Covered By Title VII, 3 DEPAUL 
BUS. & COM. L.J. 489, 509 (2005); Maltby, supra note 19, at 254; Valerie L. Jacobson, 
Bringing A Title VII Action: Which Test Regarding Standing To Sue Is The Most 
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courts
124
 have stated that there is very little substantive difference between 
each of the various tests of employee status. 
The multitude of various tests is still a serious problem, however, 
because even a small difference can lead to a different result.  
Unfortunately, despite a formal commission being established in the 
Clinton Administration to examine our nation’s employment laws and 
despite a specific recommendation being made for one uniform definition 
of employee status, (which was the economic realities test), Congress has 
not acted.
125
 
Finally, with respect to the distinction between employees and 
independent contractors, U.S. courts tend to focus on specific tests, which 
can be somewhat wooden.
126
  However, it is worth noting that the problem 
of employee status is not a uniquely American problem.
127
  Some countries 
have developed intermediate categories.  In Germany, for example, 
“employee-like persons” may be covered by labor legislation as 
“parasubordinated” persons, and “dependent contractors” may be covered 
in Italy and Canada respectively.
128
  If Congress were ever to seriously 
consider evaluating the problem of defining who an employee is, perhaps 
something can be learned from other industrialized nations. 
III. WHO IS AN EMPLOYER? 
A. Private Sector vs. Public Sector Employers 
Fundamentally, when dealing with any question of labor and 
employment law, one of the first questions to be examined is whether or 
not a private or public employer is involved.  Quite simply certain statutes 
may not be applicable if the putative employer is an arm of government.
129
 
 
Applicable?, 18 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 95, 108 (1990). 
 124. Brown v. J. Kaz, Inc., 581 F. 3d 175, 175 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009); Lambertsen v. Utah 
Dep’t of Corrs., 79 F.3d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir. 1996); Wilde v. County of Kaniyohi, 15 F.3d 
103, 106 (8th Cir. 1994); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d. Cir. 1993); Burt v. 
Broyhill Furniture Indus., No. CV-04-2929-PHX-MHM, 2006 WL 2711495 (D. Ariz. Sept. 
18, 2006). 
 125. Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 170.  Specifically, in 1993 a formal commission headed 
by former Labor Secretary John Dunlop was established to examine the U.S. labor market 
and make recommendations to Congress.  One of the Dunlop Commission’s 
recommendations was the adoption of a single uniform definition of employee.  Id.  (citing 
U.S. COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, THE DUNLOP 
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS—FINAL REPORT 64–66 
(1994)). 
 126. DAU-SCHMIDT, supra note 30, at 45. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. For example, ERISA only applies to private sector pension plans.  Wilmington 
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The converse is also true.
130
 
The private/public sector issue can arise under a number of different 
employment statutes, but is most often litigated under the NLRA and 
therefore, this Article will focus on NLRA standards as examples.
131
  The 
NLRA is the grandfather of most of today’s labor and employment laws.  
As such, courts adjudicating labor and employment issues often look to 
decisions under the NLRA for guidance.
132
 
Section 2(2) of the NLRA, as amended,
133
 excludes “political 
subdivisions” from the coverage under the Act and it is this exclusion that 
is often litigated.  However, the term “political subdivision” is not defined 
in the statute.
134
  The exemption has been construed by the Supreme Court 
in NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dis. of Hawkins County to be limited to 
entities that are either (1) created directly by the State so as to constitute 
departments or administrative arms of the government, or (2) administered 
by individuals who are responsible to public officials or to the general 
electorate.
135
  This exemption is considered narrow.
136
 
For example, the NLRB found that the State Bar of New Mexico was 
directly created by the New Mexico Supreme Court and was an 
administrative arm of the judicial branch of government.  Therefore, it was 
exempt under Hawkins first prong.
137
  Similarly, a hospital that was 
established by a city and continued to operate pursuant to a local law was 
exempt from NLRB jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that it had an 
autonomous board of trustees.
138
 
 
Shipping Co. v. New England Life Ins. Co., 496 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 130. For example, certain Whistleblower protection statutes only apply in the public 
sector.  See, e.g., New York Civil Service Law § 75-b.  Additionally, neither causes of 
action under the First Amendment, George v. Lab. Corp. of America Holdings, 522 
F.Supp.2d 761, 764 (N.D. W. Va. 2007), nor 42 U.S.C. § 1983, German v. Fox, 267 Fed. 
Appx. 231 (4th Cir. 2008), apply to private employers.   
 131. See, e.g., New York Pub. Library v. New York Pub. Emp’t. Relations Bd., 374 
N.Y.S. 2d 625 (1975) (holding employees employed by a public library were not public 
employees under the New York Taylor  law, Civil Service § 200 et seq.). 
 132. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Duty of Fair Representation Jurisprudential Reform, The 
Need To Adjudicate Disputes In Internal Union Review Tribunals and The Forgotten 
Remedy of Re-Arbitration, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 517, 542, 543 n.121 (2009). 
 133. Section 2(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. s 152(2), provides: “The term “employer” 
includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not 
include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal 
Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof . . . .” 
 134. NLRB v. Princeton Mem’l Hosp, 939 F.2d 174, 177 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 135. NLRB v. Natural Gas Util. Dist. of Hawkins Cnty., 402 U.S. 600, 604–05 (1971); 
NLRB v. Austin Developmental Ctr., Inc., 606 F.2d 785, 789 (7th Cir. 1979). 
 136. Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and Collective 
Bargaining: Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y. 885, 924 (2007). 
 137. State Bar of New Mexico, 346 N.L.R.B. 674 (2006). 
 138. Camden-Clark Mem’l Hosp., 221 N.L.R.B. 945 (1975). 
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Under Hawkins County, an entity can satisfy the second prong only if 
a majority of its board of directors is responsible to the general 
electorate.
139
  They must be appointed and subject to removal by public 
officials.
140
  Under this standard, the NLRB routinely asserts jurisdiction 
over private employers that contract with the government to provide 
governmental type services.
141
 
For example, a non-profit corporation that administered public 
research grants for the City University of New York, a public university, 
was not an exempt political subdivision where the employer was 
administered by its own board of directors, a majority of which were not 
responsible to the electorate.
142
  Similarly, a non-profit tax exempt 
corporation that provided educational and management services to public 
school academies was not exempt from the National Labor Relations 
Act.
143
 
Issues involving the distinction between private and public employers 
can also arise under a host of other statutes including state labor relations 
acts such as New York’s Taylor Law.
144
  One such developing area 
concerns the status of Charter Schools.  The New York Public Employment 
Relations Board, the administrative agency responsible for administering 
the Taylor Law, has held that Charter Schools are public schools and, as 
such, are subject to jurisdiction under the Taylor Law.
145
  The New York 
statutory scheme states that Charter Schools are public schools.
146
  
Similarly, an NLRB Regional Director held that a Chicago Charter School, 
designated by state statute as a public school, was a public employer and 
 
 139. FiveCap, Inc., v. NLRB, 294 F.3d 768, 777 (6th Cir. 2002). 
 140. Charter Sch. Admin. Servs., Inc., 353 NLRB No. 35, at *5 (2008); Research Found. 
of CUNY, 337 N.L.R.B. 965, 969 (2002). 
 141. Charter Sch. Admin. Servs., 353 NLRB at *6.  The circuits have regularly agreed 
with the NLRB’s assertion of jurisdiction in such cases.  Id. at n.23. 
 142. Research Found. of CUNY, 337 N.L.R.B. at 969 (2002); see also Conn. State 
Conference Bd., 339 NLRB 760 (2003) (discussing whether employer that has contract with 
state of Connecticut to provide public bus service is subject to the jurisdiction of NLRB); 
Family Healthcare, Inc., 354 NLRB No. 29 (2009) (non-profit corporation that operated 
medical clinics where eighty percent of its funding was received from Medicare and 
Medicaid reimbursement was found not to be an exempt political subdivision). 
 143. Charter Sch. Admin. Servs., 353 NLRB at *1; see also FiveCap, Inc., v. NLRB, 294 
F.3d 768, 777 (6th Cir. 2002) (non-profit welfare agency that received public funding not 
exempt political subdivision as a majority of its board of directors was not responsible to 
general electorate).  But see, Council of School Supervisors, 44 PERB ¶ 3001 (2011) 
(holding that Charter Schools are public employers notwithstanding the fact that they have a 
type of joint employment relationship with a private management company). 
 144. N.Y. Civil Service Law § 200 et. seq. 
 145. In re Council of School Supervisors,  44 PERB ¶ 3001 (2011). 
 146. See N.Y. Education Law § 2854.3(a) (expressly defining Charter Schools as public 
employers). 
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therefore, not subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB.  An appeal before the 
full Board is pending.
147
 
As this Article goes to print, however, the legal status of Charter 
Schools around the country remains unsettled.  This is because as PERB 
recognized, federal courts have the ultimate authority with respect to 
NLRA preemption.
148
  The federal courts have not yet addressed the status 
of Charter Schools. 
B.  Employer Definitions 
When one gets beyond the distinction between public and private 
sector employers, cases involving the definition of an employer are, like the 
definition of employee, somewhat elusive.  As with employee status,
149
 a 
contractual disclaimer of employer status is not conclusively binding.
150
  
Little academic commentary addresses employer status, yet this issue has 
spawned a significant litigation.
151
  While we know that the 
misclassification of employees is profuse, there is no current nationwide 
data which documents just how wide spread a problem this is with respect 
to employers. 
The existing data mainly concerns misclassification under the IRS 
Code, and Department of Labor data suggests that as much as ten and thirty 
percent of employers misclassify their employees.
152
  A New York State 
Survey estimated that approximately 10.3% of workers in that state are 
misclassified.
153
  A survey of Maine construction employers put that 
number at fourteen percent.
154
  Given these numbers one can extrapolate 
that employer misclassification is a significant issue as well. 
 
 147. Chicago Mathematics & Science Academy Charter Sch., Inc., 13-RM-1768 (Sept. 
20, 2010);  Press Release, NLRB (Jan. 10, 2011) (stating that the NLRB will be reviewing 
this case and inviting briefs to discuss status of Charter Schools). 
 148. In re Council of School Supervisors, 44 PERB ¶ 3001 (2011). 
 149. See infra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 150. See, e.g., J.J. Gumberg Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 889 (1971); Met. Chicago, Inc., 13-RC-
20098 (Nov. 12, 1999); accord, La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 337 N.L.R.B. 1120 (2002), 
enforced without op., 71 Fed. Appx. 441 (5th Cir. 2003) (where NLRB refuses to find joint 
employer relationship notwithstanding the fact that parties previously entered into a NLRB 
stipulated election agreement defining bargaining unit). 
 151. For an extensive review of the applicable case law for determining whether or not 
an entity is an employer under Title VII, see Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 
971 (7th Cir. 2006).  See also Annotation, When Are Separate Business Entities “Joint 
Employers” of Same Employees For Purposes Of Application of Federal Labor Laws, 73 
A.L.R. Fed. 609, § 2(a) (1985). 
 152. See EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION, supra note 25. 
 153. DONAHUE, LAMARE & KOTLER, supra note 23, at 8. 
 154. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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The Supreme Court has stated that an employer is “the person, or 
group of persons, who own and manage the enterprise.”
155
  Many courts, 
however, simply focus on the definition of an “employee”
156
 and only pay 
lip service to the statutory definition of “employer” by only examining 
whether the employer meets the statute’s numerosity requirements.
157
  The 
Fifth Circuit, for example, has characterized the applicable test in a Title 
VII case as follows: 
Determining whether a defendant is an “employer” under Title 
VII or the ADEA involves a two-step process. First, the 
defendant must fall within the statutory definition. Second, there 
must be an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant. 
To determine whether an employment relationship exists within 
the meaning of Title VII, we apply a hybrid economic 
realities/common law control test.
158
 
Other courts simply cite to one of the tests for employee status, such 
as the economic realities test
159
 or the common law right to control test.
160
 
 
 155. Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 450 (2003). 
 156. Indeed, in examining the definition of an employer under Section 2(2) of the 
NLRA, the leading treatise on labor law focuses on determining who is an employee under 
the Act.  See HIGGINS, supra note 16, at 2241–42. 
 157. Indeed, that is what the Supreme Court did in Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 454, in 
examining whether a small medical practice was subject to jurisdiction under the ADA. 
 158. Deal v. State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 117, 118 n.2 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(citation omitted) (ADEA and Title VII case); see also, Johnson v. Manpower Professional 
Services, Inc., 442 Fed. Appx. 977 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying same hybrid test in Title VII & 
42 U.S.C. § 1981 case); Muhammad v. Dallas Cnty. Cmty. Supervision & Corrs. Dep’t, 479 
F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 2007) (purporting to apply this test to Title VII case); Hill v. City of 
Austin Public Works, No. A-08-CV-079 LY, 2008 WL 750566, at *2 (W.D. Texas 2008), 
aff’d, 360 Fed Appx. 582 (5th Cir. Jan. 14, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 461 (2010) 
(applying hybrid test in Title VII case); Thomson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1329, 
1334 n.8 (D. Kans. 1994) (applying hybrid test in Title VII and state law case). 
 159. Rodriquez v. Jones Boat Yard, No. 10-15326, 2011 WL 3252569 (11th Cir. July 26, 
2011) (FLSA case); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1011–12 (9th Cir. 1999) (FLSA 
case); Hale v. Ariz., 993 F. 2d 1387, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993) (FLSA case); St. John v. NCI 
Bldg. Sys., 537 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Tex. 2008), aff’d. on other grounds, 299 Fed. Appx. 
308 (5th Cir. 2008) (ADA case); Callais v. Shell Oil Co., No. 10-2105, 2011 WL 3490064 
(E.D. La. 2011) (Title VII case). 
 160. Shah v. Bank of America, 346 Fed. Appx. 831, 2009 WL 415619, at *6–7 (D. Del. 
Feb. 18, 2009) (applying common law right to control test to employee in order to determine 
whether or not defendant was plaintiffs employer under Title VII); King’s Brass Ceremonial 
v. Comm’r of Labor, 904 N.Y.S. 2d 543 (App. Div. 2010) (explaining that in determining 
whether an entity was liable for unemployment insurance contributions, the court looks to 
see if an employment relationship exists by applying common law right to control test); 
Gulino v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 378 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying common law test 
in Title VII case); accord, Forsythe v. NYC Dep’t of Citywide Admin. Servs., 733 F. Supp. 
2d 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, No. 10–3230–cv, 2011 WL 2473496 (2d Cir. 2011) (in 
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Indeed in a recent article, a well-known employment scholar, Timothy 
Glynn, in discussing employer status simply cited to the Restatement’s 
common law test.
161
  Additionally, in one high profile case when faced with 
the issue of whether law firm partners were employers or employees, the 
court focused simply on whether or not the partners were in fact 
employees-not whether they met the definition of employer.
162
 
In Gulino, the Second Circuit issued an important decision that 
illustrated this principle of employer status.
163
  The court was faced with 
whether the State Education Department could be held liable as an 
employer under Title VII because it developed a certification test that 
teachers had to pass in order to receive a license.  Though the court was 
faced squarely with the issue of whether the State Education Department 
was an employer under Title VII, the court simply looked to whether the 
plaintiffs in question where employees under the applicable test for 
employee status. 
The court ultimately held that the plaintiffs were not employees 
because they could not meet the threshold showing that the State Education 
Department hired and compensated them.  Additionally, a master-servant 
relationship was not established under the common law right to control 
test.
164
 
There is also some Supreme Court precedent under the FLSA that 
supports the notion that employer status can be determined by looking to 
 
determining whether or not joint employer status was established, the court held that such a 
relationship exists where there is sufficient evidence that one entity had immediate control 
over another company’s employees) (citations omitted). 
 161. Glynn, supra note 18, at 108 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 220 and 
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.07(3)(a)). 
 162. EEOC v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 707 (7th Cir. 2002); see also 
Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2006) (same).  But see  Kirleis v. 
Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 2009 WL 3602008, No. 06-CV-1495, at *2 n.4 (W.D. 
Pa. Oct. 28, 2009), aff’d, No. 09-498, 2010 WL 2780927 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S.Ct. 935 (2011) (relying on Clackamas factors to distinguish between attorney shareholder 
employers and attorney shareholder employees and holding that shareholder attorney was an 
employer); see also N.Y. Hotel & Casino, 356 NLRB No. 119 (2011) (focusing on the 
definition of employee in holding that under certain circumstances, a third party employer 
can commit an unfair labor practice with respect to employees of a contractor).  In another 
high profile litigation, the EEOC settled a case alleging that a law firm’s mandatory 
retirement policy violated the ADEA and therefore, the court did not have to decide whether 
law firm partners were employees. See, Joseph Palazzolo, Kelley Drye Settles with EEOC 
over Age Bias Claims, Wall Street Journal Law Blog, 
blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/04/10/kelley-drye-settles-with-eeoc-over-age-bias-claims/ (April 
10, 2012).  
 163. 460 F.3d at 378. 
 164. Id. at 379.  As the court explained:  SED does have some control over New York 
City school teachers—e.g., it controls basic curriculum and credentialing requirements—but 
SED does not exercise the workday supervision necessary to an employment relationship.  
Id. 
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employee status, but the Court did not directly hold that employer status is 
determined by examining employee status.
165
  Unfortunately, however, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has never expressly defined the term “employer.” 
The closest the Supreme Court has come in defining who an employer 
is was in Clackamus Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells,
166
 where the 
Court had to address whether a small medical practice was an employer 
under the ADA.  In deciding the case, the Court did not focus on the 
definition of employer under the statute, but instead focused on the 
definition of an employee. 
This is understandable in this case, as well as in some of the others, 
because the issue was whether the medical practice met the ADA’s 
employee-numerosity requirement of having fifteen or more employees.
167
  
The ADA, like most employment statutes,
168
 simply defined an employer as 
having “15 or more employees for each working day.”
169
  If the four 
physician shareholders counted, then the practice would be subject to the 
ADA. 
The Court struggled with whether or not the shareholders were 
employees.  The Court stated that the definition of an employee under the 
 
 165. In Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28 (1961), the Court, in 
examining whether or not a cooperative was an employer and its members who mostly 
worked at home were employees under the FLSA, saw “nothing inherently inconsistent 
between the coexistence of a proprietary and an employment relationship.”  Id. at 32.  In 
making a determination as to employment status, the Court stated that “‘economic reality’ 
rather than ‘technical concepts’ is to be the test of employment.”  Id. at 33.  Thus, the Court 
appears to have not seen a distinction between the test of employee and employer status.  
Accord,  Xue Liam Lin v. Comprehensive Health Mgmt, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 6519 (PKC), 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64625, slip op. at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2009) (stating that in 
determining employer status under FLSA, the overarching concern is whether the employer 
has the power to control workers with an eye towards the economic reality of the facts). 
Whitaker House may not be of much significance outside of the context of the FLSA.  
Section 3(g) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g), defines the term “employ” as to “suffer or 
permit work” and that statutory language is not included in most other employment laws.  
That language is also considered to be particularly broad.  Barfield v. NYC Health & Hosp. 
Corp., 537 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 2008).  The issue in this case also had to do with the 
validity of a regulation concerning industrial homework. 
 166. 538 U.S. at 440.  Indeed, the Court noted in a footnote that it was distinguishing 
between an employee and an employer.  Id. at 445 n.5. 
 167. The term “employee-numerosity requirement,” as far as I can tell, is a phrase coined 
by the Supreme Court in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 505 (2006).  The actual 
counting of employees is not as simple as it may seem when one considers that employees 
may be hired and discharged by an employer and some employees work part-time.  See 
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 108 (discussing how to count employees for the purpose of 
defining employer status).  I have previously noted the importance of numerosity 
requirements in employment law.  Rubinstein, supra note 4, at 151–52. 
 168. See EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION, supra note 25 (quoting the definition of 
employer contained in various statutes); See also Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enter., Inc., 519 
U.S. 202, 207 (1997) (discussing definitions of employer under Title VII). 
 169. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2006). 
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statute—“an individual employed by an employer”
170
—was “nominal,” that 
it is “completely circular and explains nothing.”
171
  The Court then had to 
determine the appropriate test that it would apply. 
The Court refused to adopt the common law right to control test that it 
had earlier adopted in an ERISA case,
172
 because the issue did not involve 
the line between employees and independent contractors.  Rather, the issue 
the Court was faced with was “whether a shareholder-director is an 
employee or, alternatively, the kind of person that the common law would 
consider an employer.”
173
 
Nevertheless, the Court did recognize that the common law right to 
control standard provided helpful guidance and adopted the position of the 
EEOC, which implied that shareholders could not be employees.  The 
Court adopted the EEOC’s six-factor, non-exhaustive test (which does not 
have a name), in haec verba that examines: 
1. Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set 
the rules and regulations of the individual’s work; and 
2. Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises 
the individual’s work; and 
3. Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the 
organization; and 
4. Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to 
influence the organization; and 
5. Whether the parties intended that the individual be an 
employee, as expressed in written agreements or contracts; 
and 
6. Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and 
liabilities of the organization.
174
 
The Court also recognized that titles are not controlling and that there 
is no “shorthand formula or magic phrase” that could provide a quick 
answer with respect to employer status.  Rather, the issue is to be resolved 
by looking at the totality of the circumstances.
175
 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and Justice Breyer, wrote an 
important dissent where she did not see anything inherently inconsistent 
 
 170. Id. § 12111(4). 
 171. 538 U.S. at 444. 
 172. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24 (1992) (citing Cmty. for 
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 730 (1989)). 
 173. Id. at 445. 
 174. Id. at 626; see also De Jesus v. LTT Card Servs., Inc., 474 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 
2007) (holding that Clackamus applies to both cases under the ADA as well as Title VII). 
 175. Id.; see also Feldmann v N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 4:09-CV-2129 MLM, 2011 WL 
382201, at *9 (E.D. Mo, Feb. 3, 2011) (stating that under Title VII whether an individual is 
an employee or an independent contractor “requires more than simply tallying factors on 
each side and selecting the winner on the basis of a point score”) (quoting Lerohl v. Friends 
of Minn. Sinfonia, 322 F.3d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 2003)). 
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between individuals having both proprietary and employment relationships.  
This is because the physician-shareholders often functioned as common 
law employees.
176
 
In an exhaustive law review article which discusses the employer 
status of shareholders and partners, Professor Ann McGinley has criticized 
Clackamas precisely on this point.  Professor McGinley reasoned that 
many partners work for the partnership in the same fashion as 
employees.
177
  As Professor McGinley explains: 
Although the vice president or other upper level manager of a 
corporation can be simultaneously an “employer” and an 
“employee” under the anti-discrimination acts, the Court assumes 
that a partner or shareholder cannot serve both roles of 
“employer” and“employee.” The language of Title VII, the 
ADEA, and the ADA do not distinguish between partnerships 
and general corporations in their definitions of who is a “person” 
under the acts; neither does the statutory language distinguish 
between partnerships and corporations as “employers.”  It cannot 
be correct, therefore, that partners are not “employees” merely 
because they are “employers.”
178
 
The very next year, however, Justice Ginsburg voted with the majority 
in a case that dealt with whether a working owner, who was the sole 
shareholder and president of a professional corporation, was a “participant” 
under ERISA.  The Court rejected the notion that business owners could 
only be considered employers under ERISA.
179
  ERISA defines 
“participant” as “any employee or former employee of an employer.”
180
 
The Court, however, did not discuss the common law or other 
employment law tests, which dominated Clackamas, but instead simply 
focused on the language of ERISA.  Thus, under ERISA a participant can 
be an employer and an employee.  However, beyond ERISA, under 
Clackamas it would appear that an individual cannot be an employer and 
an employee at the same time under most employment statutes.
181
 
 
 176. The Seventh Circuit has indicated that the purpose of the Clackamas test is to 
distinguish between employers and employees.  Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 
971, 979 n.4 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 177. Ann C. McGinley, Functionality or Formalism? Partners and Shareholders as 
“Employees” Under the Anti-Discrimination Laws, 57 SMU L. REV. 3, 34–35 (2004). 
 178. Id.  Professor McGinley also noted that the anti-discrimination acts include “agents” 
in the definition of “employer” and partners can be seen as agents of the employer.  Id. 
 179. Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 6 (2004). 
 180. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (2006). 
 181. See Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C.,  No. 06-CV-1495, 2009 WL 
3602008 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009), aff’d, No. 09-4498, 2010 WL 2780927 (3d Cir. July 15, 
2010) (holding that there is a threshold issue of employee status for the attorney partner 
because if the partner is an employer he is not protected under Title VII, the FLSA and state 
human rights law).  Clackamas would not, however, prevent a partner from being 
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Finally, it should be noted that the same issue of employment status is 
involved when examining whether Board of Director members who also 
work at the company may be subject to the control of the business just like 
any other employee.
182
 
IV. QUASI-EMPLOYERS 
In most cases, coverage under our nation’s employment laws boils 
down to the question of whether or not the individuals in question are 
“employees” and whether or not the entity in question is an “employer.”  In 
fact, one important commentator referred to contemporary labor and 
employment law as involving privity of contract between an employer and 
employee as the basis for coverage under law.
183
 
Significantly, however, there are a burgeoning number of cases
184
 
where employer status is found in the absence of a direct relationship to a 
statutory employer.  I refer to these entities as quasi-employers because 
they are not employers in the traditional sense, yet they are subject to the 
dictates of employment law legislation.
185
 
 
considered an employee if the person truly functioned as an employee, they just could not be 
considered both under the statute.  As the Court explains: 
     Today there are partnerships that include hundreds of members, some of 
whom may qualify as “employees” because control is concentrated in a small 
number of managing partners.  Cf.  Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 
n.2, (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (‘[A]n employer may not evade the 
strictures of Title VII simply be labeling its employees as partners.’); EECO v. 
Sidley Brown & Wood, 315 F.3d 696, 709 (CA7 2002) (Easterbrook, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Strother v. Southern California 
Permanente Medical Group, 79 F.3d 859 (CA9 1996).  Thus, asking whether 
shareholder-directors are partners—rather than asking whether they are 
employees—simply begs the question.   
Clackamas Gastroenterology Assoc. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 446 (2003). 
 182. Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971, 986 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Kern 
v. City of Rochester, 93 F. 3d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that while Board members are 
generally considered employers under Title VII, they can be considered employees 
depending upon their responsibilities); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 
1539–40 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that Board of Director members were employees under 
ADEA because each performed traditional employee duties, worked full-time and reported 
to others). 
 183. Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside The Employment Relation, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1527, 
1537 (1996); see also Gulino v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 374 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(indicating that a direct employment relationship is the typical Title VII case). 
 184. Indeed, one court has stated that there is an overwhelming amount of authority that 
rejects the notion there must be a direct employment relationship between an employer and 
an employer for Title VII liability to attach.  Gore v. The RBA Group, No. 03-CV-9442, 
2008 WL 857530, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008) (collecting cases). 
 185. Some courts are apparently unaware of this line of case law because they state that 
Title VII “only” authorizes suit against employers, employment agencies, labor 
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A. Employer Status in the Absence of a Direct Employment Relationship 
While at first blush it might seem a bit odd to apply our nation’s 
employment laws to entities that are not employers in the traditional sense, 
upon close examination, there is quite a bit of support for this principle.  
The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII to apply to former employees 
even though Title VII simply uses the term “employee.”  Thus, former 
employees could bring suit for post-employment retaliatory actions (such 
as a negative employment reference).
186
  This demonstrates that the term 
“employee,” and by extension the term “employer,” is not limited to 
individuals who have a direct and explicit ongoing employment 
relationship. 
Additionally, Congress has chosen to regulate, through our labor laws, 
situations where there is no direct employer-employee relationship in the 
context of secondary activity of unions.  Through its provisions on 
secondary boycotts, the NLRA protects employers who are not themselves 
the employer of the union employees in question.  Rather, the NLRA 
protects those employers that are simply doing business with an entity that 
the union has a labor dispute with.
187
  The union is prohibited from 
imposing significant secondary pressure, such as picketing, on that 
“neutral” employer.
188
 
Moreover, a similar legal concept to quasi-employer liability is the 
“controlling employer” citation policy under the Occupational Safety and 
 
organizations and training programs.  Shah v. Bank of America, 598 F. Supp. 2d 596 (D. 
Del. 2009), aff’d, 346 Fed. Appx. 831 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Scaglione v. Chappaqua 
Cent. Sch. Dist., 209 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating “that direct 
employment relationship is a necessary trait of a Title VII ‘employer’”); Burke v. Nalco 
Chem. Co., No. 96-C-981, 1996 WL 411456, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 18, 1996) (stating that 
“[a]n employer who does not fit within the FMLA’s definition is not bound by its terms.”). 
 186. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 339 (1997).  In holding that Title VII 
applies to former employees, the Court noted that the statute does not contain any temporal 
qualifier which indicates whether it applies to former employees, but the statute does 
contain remedial provisions concerning reinstatement and hiring.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
5(g)(1) (2006) (containing the language discussed by the Court).  Because current 
employees are not normally reinstated, this supports the holding that Title VII applies to 
former employees.  Robinson, 519 U.S. at 347.  The Court also looked to the purposes of 
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provisions and reasoned that it would be destructive to the 
statutory purpose if an employer were able to retaliate with impunity against former 
employees.  Id. at 349. 
 187. In labor relations parlance, the employer that the union has the dispute with is the 
primary employer and the secondary employer that the union seeks to pressure is the entity 
that has some type of relationship with the primary employer.  HIGGINS, supra note 16, at 
1741.  The secondary employer is considered to be neutral.  Id. at 1746. 
 188. See NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607, 614–15 
(1980) (holding that union picketing aimed at customers of secondary employer is 
prohibited unless picket signs expressly ask consumers not to purchase products of the 
primary employer). 
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Health Act (hereinafter “OSHA”).
189
  OSHA provides that a controlling 
employer has a general duty to furnish a safe worksite for its own 
employees as well as other employees on a multi-employer work site.
190
 
The “controlling employer” citation policy provides that the agency 
may issue citations to general contractors at construction sites that have the 
ability to prevent or abate hazardous conditions, regardless of whether the 
general contractor’s employees were involved.
191
  In effect, such general 
contractors are quasi-employers because they do not directly employ the 
subcontractors, yet they are subject to employment regulation.  Some states 
have enacted similar legislation with respect to liability for unpaid 
wages.
192
 
More fundamentally, the nature of work and American workplaces has 
changed and will likely continue to change.  There are fewer full-time 
employees and more part-time employees, temporary employees, 
independent contractors, and home workers.
193
  Today, there can even be 
workers without workplaces,
194
 and some employees work together in 
virtual worlds.
195
  Indeed, some believe that there is a movement away from 
employees having long-term, established relationships with their employers 
in favor of a more short-term contingent relationship.
196
 
 
 189. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–52 (2006). 
 190. Id. § 654; Marshall v. Knutson Constr. Co., 566 F.2d 596, 599–600 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 191. Solis v. Summit Contractors, Inc., 558 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2009) (upholding 
Secretary of Labor’s controlling employer citation policy after extensively reviewing its 
history and applicable case law).  OSHA’s controlling employer policy is somewhat related 
to case law examining whether or not an individual can be held liable as an employer under 
the FLSA.  In several FLSA cases, corporate officers and individuals with operational 
control of the enterprise could be held responsible if they are involved in day to day 
operations or have some direct responsibility for the employee in question.  Patel v. Wargo, 
803 F.2d 632, 637–38 (11th Cir. 1986); De Leon-Granados v. Eller & Sons Trees, Inc., 581 
F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1303 (N.D. Ga. 2008).  See infra notes 289–308 and accompanying text 
(discussing supervisory liability under employment law statutes). 
 192. A California state law imposes liability on garment manufacturers if the employing 
subcontractor is unable to pay even though the manufacturer does not have an employment 
relationship with the subcontractor’s employees.  Glynn, supra note 18, at 121 (citing CAL. 
LAB. CODE § 2673.1 (West 2010)).  Illinois and New York have enacted similar legislation.  
Id. at 121–22. 
 193. Mosley, supra note 10; see also Stone, supra note 22. 
 194. An example of workers without a workplace would be home workers and 
telecommuters.  See Stone, supra note 22, at 271 (discussing increasing use of home 
workers and telecommuters).  An example of employees without employers would be 
individuals who work for small employers that do not meet the numerosity requirements 
under a given statute, as well as independent contractors who may work side to side with 
employees.  See id. (discussing the changing nature of the workplace).  The notion that the 
American workplace is undergoing change is hardly new.  See Becker, supra note 183 
(arguing that existing legal doctrines are ineffective in regulating new forms of work). 
 195. Miriam A. Cherry, A Taxonomy of Virtual Work, 45 GA. L. REV. 951 (2011) 
(discussing in detail the new forms of work that are arising due to technological advances). 
 196. DAU-SCHMIDT, supra note 30. 
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In the workplaces of the future, litigation with respect to the status of 
employers is likely to continue because relationships will be increasingly 
atypical and will not involve a direct employer-employee relationship.  It 
is, therefore, important to examine the status of quasi-employers.
197
 
Several courts have recognized that the term “employer” is not limited 
to employers that have a direct relationship with employees.
198
  In such 
cases there are several theories concerning the liability of third party quasi-
employers:  Sibley Interference Theory, Spirt Delegation Theory, Joint 
Employer Theory, Single Employer Theory, and Individual Supervisory 
Liability Theory.  This Article now turns to a discussion of each of these 
legal doctrines.
199
 
 
 197. Indeed, the work environment of the future may not look anything like the work 
environment today.  In 2009, Time Magazine ran a special report on the future of work and 
concluded that in the future, work will be more flexible, more freelance, more collaborative, 
and far less secure.  Alex Altman et al., The Way We’ll Work, TIME, May 25, 2009, at 39.  
Moreover, the traditional notions of an office environment may become completely 
obsolete.  Thus, the workforce of the future often may not even involve showing up to a 
physical workplace at all.  As one article in Time’s Special Report explained: 
More and more, though, the need to actually show up at an office that consists 
of an anonymous hallway and a farm of cubicles or closed doors is just going to 
fade away. It’s too expensive, and it’s too slow.  I’d rather send you a file at the 
end of my day (when you’re in a very different time zone) and have the 
information returned to my desktop when I wake up tomorrow.  We may never 
meet, but we’re both doing essential work. 
Seth Godin, The Last Days Of Cubicle Life, TIME, May 25, 2009, at 5.  Indeed, the future 
may already be upon us.  In 2008, a San Francisco corporate law firm called Virtual Law 
Partners opened.  This firm has no physical office, has forty partners and all the attorneys 
work remotely.  See Stephanie Francis Ward, Virtually Practicing: Those Wanting Face 
Time Need Not Apply, A.B.A. J., at 51 (June 2009) (discussing the dispersed nature of the 
firm).   
 198. Assoc. of Mexican-American Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 580 (9th Cir. 
2000) (en banc) (“A direct employment relationship is not a prerequisite to Title VII 
liability”); Gore v. RBA Group, No. 03-CV-9442, 2008 WL 857530 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 
2008); Laurin v. Pokoik, No. 02-CIV-1938, 2004 WL 513999, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 
2004).  Contra, Scaglione v. Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 209 F. Supp.2d 311, 315 n.5 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that “a direct employment relationship is a necessary trait of a Title 
VII ‘employer’”). 
 199. Nevertheless, it is still recognized that the existence of an employer-employee 
relationship is the primary element of a Title VII claim.  Gulino v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t, 460 
F.3d 361, 370 (2d Cir. 2006); Pratt v. Hustedt Chevrolet, Index No. 05-4148 (DRH) (MLO), 
2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 26312, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2009).  When liability is found under 
a quasi-employer theory, there is still an employer relationship.  It is simply not a direct 
employment relationship and therefore not an employment relationship in the traditional 
sense. 
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B. Sibley Interference Theory 
In 1973, the D.C. Circuit held that employers had a duty under Title 
VII not to discriminate against employees whose employment opportunities 
could be affected by an employer even if that employer did not directly 
employ the individual in question.
200
  The plaintiff was a private duty nurse 
who worked at the defendant hospital, but who was paid exclusively by the 
patient and only worked with that patient.
201
  The plaintiff alleged sex 
discrimination under Title VII after the hospital prevented him from 
working with female patients.
202
 
The hospital sought dismissal because there was no direct employment 
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant hospital.  In rejecting 
the hospital’s argument, the court reasoned in part: 
To permit a covered employer to exploit circumstances peculiarly 
affording it the capability of discriminatorily interfering with an 
individual’s employment opportunities with another employer, 
while it could not do so with respect to employment in its own 
service, would be to condone continued use of the very criteria 
for employment that Congress has prohibited.
203
 
The court found it significant that Title VII provided that a charge of 
discrimination could be filed with the EEOC by a “person aggrieved” as 
opposed to the narrower class of “employees.”
204
  Equally significant to the 
court was the fact that Title VII coverage is not limited to “employers” in 
that labor unions and employment agencies are also subject to Title VII.
205
  
Therefore, the court held that Title VII coverage was appropriate because 
of the plaintiff’s close nexus to the employer as well as the spirit and 
language of the Act.
206
 
As the Sibley court’s holding was largely based upon the interference 
with employment opportunities, subsequent decisions involving similar 
issues have been referred to by some courts as “interference” theory.”
207
 
In Association of Mexican-American Educators v. California, the 
Ninth Circuit endorsed the Sibley interference theory by holding that 
California was subject to liability, even though the state did not directly 
 
 200. Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973).  Sibley has been 
described by a major employment law treatise as the leading case in this area of law. 
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 108. 
 201. Sibley, 488 F. 2d at 1341. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 1342. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Gulino, 460 F.3d at 373 (2d Cir. 2006); Assoc. of Mexican-American Educators v. 
California, 231 F.3d 572, 580 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
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employ the plaintiffs, because it “interfered” with the employment 
relationship between school teachers and the employing schools.
208
  That 
case involved a claim, under Title VII, that challenged the validity of 
California’s Basic Education Skills test, a perquisite for employment as a 
teacher in California.
209
 
Though several courts have followed the D.C. Circuit’s lead in 
Sibley,
210
 a conflict in the circuits developed after the First Circuit’s 
decision in Lopez v. Massachusetts.
211
  In Lopez, the court rejected Sibley, 
reasoning that the definition of an employer is limited to the common law 
standard.
212
  As support, the First Circuit cited to several U.S. Supreme 
Court cases which held that “when a statute contains the term ‘employee’ 
but does not define it, a court must presume that Congress has incorporated 
traditional agency principles . . . .”
213
  The problem, of course, with the First 
Circuit’s rationale is that when examining the Sibley Interference Theory 
the court is examining employer status, not employee status. 
The First Circuit, however, is not entirely alone. The Second Circuit, 
has essentially rejected Sibley,  but for different reasons than the First 
Circuit in Lopez.
214
  The court reasoned that the term “employer” should 
not be interpreted expansively and indicated that the straightforward 
language of Title VII does not appear to support a Sibley like claim.
215
  This 
led the court to state that while Congress imposed liability under Title VII 
on additional parties who are not “employers” (such as labor unions), 
“absent some evidence that Congress intended otherwise, we conclude that 
all other parties with a similar ‘nexus’ to a plaintiff’s employment are 
 
 208. 231 F. 3d at 581. 
 209. Id. at 577. 
 210. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 108, at § 2:3.  See Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. 
Wholesaler’s Assoc. of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12, 17–18 (1st Cir. 1994) (ADA case); 
Charlton v. Paramus Bd. of Educ., 25 F.3d 194, 198 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994) (Title VII case); 
Christopher v. Stouder Mem’l Hosp., 936 F.2d 870, 876–77 (6th Cir. 1991) (Title VII case); 
Assoc. of Mexican-American Educators, 231 F.3d at 580 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Title VII 
case); Pardazi v. Cullman Med. Ctr., 838 F.2d 1155, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988) (Title VII case); 
Zaklama v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 842 F. 2d 291, 294 (11th Cir. 1988) (Title VII and 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 case). 
 211. 588 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Smiley v. Ohio, No. 1:10-CV-390, 2011 WL 
4481350 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2011) (discussing conflict in the circuits). 
 212. 588 F.3d at 83. 
 213. Id. (citing Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 448 
(2003)); Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enter., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1997); Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. 
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739–40 (1989). 
 214. Gulino v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 374–76 (2d Cir. 2006); see also 
Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp., No. 06-1707-CV, 2008 WL 2609712, at *14 (2d 
Cir. Jan. 16, 2008) (stating that it has no need to decide whether Gulino closed the door 
entirely to the Sibley interference theory of liability). 
 215. Gulino, 460 F.3d at 374. 
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excluded from the Title VII liability scheme.”
216
 
The Supreme Court has never addressed the Sibley interference 
theory. 
C. Spirt Delegation Theory 
In Spirt v. Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association, the defendant 
insurance company managed a pension fund to which employees were 
required to contribute.
217
  That pension fund distributed higher pension 
payments to males, based on actuarial tables that showed longer average 
life expectancies for women than for men.
218
  The defendant insurance 
company sought dismissal of the sex discrimination charge under Title VII 
because they were not the employer of the employees in question.
219
 
In holding that the insurance company could indeed face liability, the 
Second Circuit broadly interpreted the term “employer” somewhat 
similarly to Sibley.  It stated that “the term ‘employer,’ as it is used in Title 
VII, is sufficiently broad to encompass any party who significantly affects 
access of any individual to employment opportunities . . . .”
220
  Moreover, 
the court reasoned that “exempting plans not actually administered by an 
employer would seriously impair the effectiveness of Title VII . . . .”
221
  The 
Spirt Court wanted to avoid suggesting that “’an employer can avoid his 
responsibilities by delegating discriminatory programs to corporate shells.  
Title VII applies to ‘any agent’ of a covered employer . . . .’”
222
 
In Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, the Supreme Court held 
that the corollary was also true.  A traditional employer could be liable for 
the acts of insurance companies that discriminate in how they offer benefits 
to employees.  The Norris Court’s reasoning was as follows: 
Since employers are ultimately responsible for the 
“compensation, terms, conditions, [and] privileges of 
employment” provided to employees, an employer that adopts a 
fringe-benefit scheme that discriminates among its employees on 
 
 216. Id. at 375.  It should also be noted, however, that the D.C. Circuit itself did not 
extend Sibley by refusing to impose liability on the Bureau of Engraving and Printing as a 
“consumer” of tour guide services, holding that Congress never intended to impose civil 
rights liability on consumer choice.  See Redd v. Summers, 232 F.3d 933, 941 (D.C. Cir. 
2000);  see also Smiley, No. 1:10-CV-390, 2011 WL 4481350, at n.6 (stating that Sibley is 
limited to an “intermediary” between employees and organizations that employ them). 
 217. 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 463 U.S. 
1223 (1983). 
 218. Id. at 1058. 
 219. Id. at 1060. 
 220. Id. at 1063. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. (quoting City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 718 
n.33 (1978)). 
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the basis of race, religion, sex or national origin violates Title VII 
regardless of whether third parties  are also involved in the 
discrimination.
223
 
The First Circuit followed Spirt in Carparts Distribution Center v. 
Automotive Wholesaler’s Association of New England, Inc.
224
  Specifically, 
the court invoked Spirt to hold that a trade association could be held legally 
responsible as an employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act with 
respect to benefits.
225
  The court reasoned, however, that liability would 
only be found if the plan existed for the purpose of allowing the employer 
to delegate its responsibility to provide health insurance benefits to its 
employees.
226
 
The Sixth Circuit, however, reached a seemingly opposite result from 
Spirt and held that the same pension plan, TIAA-CREF, could not be held 
liable for employment discrimination.
227
  It disapproved of the lower 
court’s rationale for finding liability:  that the close ties between the 
university and TIAA-CREF were too great to allow each to deny 
liability.
228
  The court also indicated that the university did not retain 
TIAA-CREF as an agent or delegate any responsibility to it.
229
  
Unfortunately, the court’s decision in this regard is brief and conclusory.  
This decision was also vacated by the Supreme Court.
230
  Therefore, it is 
difficult to draw any conclusions from it. 
In 2008, the Second Circuit, in the same case which questioned 
Sibley’s interference theory, narrowly limited Spirt to cases where the 
direct employer delegated a core responsibility to a third party, such as an 
entity providing pension benefits.
231
  Therefore, it held that the State of 
New York, which required teachers to pass a test to receive a teacher’s 
license, could not be held liable under Title VII merely because the State 
imposed a regulation in the exercise of its concern over teacher 
competence.
232
  It is unclear what situations today would fall into the 
 
 223. Ariz. Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1089 (1983) ; see also Morgan v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., 884 F.2d 1211, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 1989) (footnote omitted) (stating 
that an employer can be vicariously liable for a discriminatory deferred compensation plan 
administered by a third party, where the employer has some control over the program). 
 224. 37 F.3d 12, 17–18 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 225. Id. 
 226. The court held that relevant to this inquiry was whether the trade association had the 
authority to determine benefit levels, whether alternate plans were available to employees, 
and whether the traditional employer shared administrative responsibilities.  Id. 
 227. Peters v. Wayne State Univ., 691 F.2d 235, 241 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983). 
 228. Id. at 238. 
 229. Id. 
 230. 463 U.S. 1223 (1983). 
 231. Gulino v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t, 460 F.3d 361, 376–77 (2006). 
 232. Id. at 378. 
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category of delegation, other than a direct delegation of a pension or health 
insurance plan.
233
 
In 2009, however, the Second Circuit issued a significant decision 
with respect to employer status without citing Spirt or any of the cases 
concerning quasi-employer status.  In Halpert v. Manhattan Apartments, 
Inc., the court held that an employer could be held liable for the actions of 
an independent contractor where the employer authorized the independent 
contractor to make hiring decisions or where the independent contractor 
had the apparent authority to make such decisions.
234
 
Though Halpert does not expressly address Spirt or even employer 
status, it implicitly supports that line of case law because it recognizes that 
an entity can be held liable for discrimination where it delegated important 
functions to a third-party independent contractor.
235
 
Additionally, the Labor Board’s controversial decision in New York 
Hotel and Casino
236
 appears to provide additional support for both the 
Sibley interference theory and the Spirt delegation theory.  Though the 
Board did not cite to either decision, and this decision dealt with the issue 
of unfair labor practices, the Board held that a property owner could violate 
the Act by barring employees of a contractor from its premises.
237
 
As is so often done in cases involving the definition of employers, the 
Board focused on the definition of employee and held that the “Act clearly 
regulates the relationship between an employer (such as NYNY) and 
employees of other employers . . . .”
238
  While this decision is consistent 
with Supreme Court precedent under the Act, which held that the definition 
of an employee is not limited to situations where the disputants stand in a 
proximate relation of employer and employee,
239
 it should be pointed out 
 
 233. Even before Gulino, one lower court questioned whether Spirt was good law, but 
for different reasons.  Seaglione v. Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist., 209 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 
n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  The court’s questioning of Spirt was based upon later cases holding 
that for an employee relationship to exist, there must be a hiring and the putative employees 
must receive some form of remuneration.  Id.  However, that aspect of Seaglione is limited 
to defining employee status, and does not appear relevant to employer status. 
 234. 580 F.3d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 235. Halpert followed the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Dunn v. Washington County 
Hospital, 429 F. 3d 689, 691–92 (7th Cir. 2005), where the court held that an employer can 
be held responsible for sexual harassment by an independent contractor-doctor who had 
privileges at the hospital that employed the plaintiff.  The court reasoned that employers 
have a responsibility to provide nondiscriminatory working conditions.  Unfortunately, the 
court did not cite Spirt or any of the cases concerning quasi-employers.  But see Houston v. 
Manheim-New York, No. 09 Civ. 4544(SCR)(GAY), 2010 WL 744119, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 3, 2010) (stating that agency theory does not create liability for individuals under Title 
VII). 
 236. 356 NLRB No. 119 (Mar. 25, 2011). 
 237. Id. at *14. 
 238. Id. at *5. 
 239. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 192 (1941) (noting the 
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that the NLRB expressly relied upon a statute which states that liability is 
not limited to employers who have a direct relationship with employees.
240
 
While the utility of this decision, as well as the body of jurisprudence 
it relies upon beyond NLRB case law, is unknown, it is included here 
because it supports the notion that third-party employers who have no 
direct employment relationship with the employees in question can be held 
liable.  Therefore, such employers fit within the definition of a quasi-
employer as that term is used in this Article. 
Finally, it should be noted that if Spirt and Sibley remain viable, it is 
possible that an employer may face liability under both theories.  A lower 
court cited both Spirt and Sibley for the proposition that an employer can be 
liable as a third party where it interferes with the employment relationship 
and controls access to or the working environment of the plaintiff.
241
 
D. Joint Employer Theory 
The concept of a joint employer cannot be discussed without also 
discussing the related single employer doctrine, which this Article 
discusses below.
242
  The terms are often used interchangeably and the line 
between the two is often blurred.
243
  Under a joint employer analysis, each 
employer has control over the employees, while under a single employer 
theory, two separate entities are considered as one.
244
 
This Article considers both joint and single employers to be within the 
rubric of quasi-employers, because both of these concepts involve atypical 
employment relationships where one entity may not directly employ the 
individuals in question. 
The issue of joint employer status has been subject to much 
litigation
245
 and has long been recognized in traditional labor law.
246
  The 
issue frequently arises in the context of closely related companies, such as a 
 
congressional belief “’that disputes may arise regardless of whether the disputants stand in 
the proximate relation of employer and employee . . . .’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1147, at 9 
(1935)). 
 240. 356 NLRB No. 119, 2011 WL 1113038, at *5 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006) 
(providing in part that the term employee “shall not be limited to employees of a particular 
employer. . . .”)). 
 241. People v. Holiday Inns, Inc., No. 83-CV-564S, 1993 WL 30933, at *5–7 (W.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 28, 1993). 
 242. See infra Section IV(E). 
 243. HIGGINS, supra note 16, at 2247. 
 244. Dias v. Cmty. Action Project, No. 07-CV-5163, 2009 WL 595601 (E.D. of N.Y. 
Mar. 6, 2009), at *3–4; see also NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (distinguishing between single and joint employers). 
 245. See ALR, supra note 151. 
 246. See Becker, supra note 183, at 1540–44 (discussing NLRB joint employer 
doctrine). 
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parent and its subsidiary corporations, where both are alleged to be the 
employer of a certain employee.
247
 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that under the FLSA, an 
employee can have more than one employer, and indicated that it was 
appropriate to look at whether related activities are involved, whether 
unified operation exists, and whether the entities shared common control 
and a common business purpose.
248
 
A finding of joint employment status is significant because all joint 
employers may be individually and jointly responsible for compliance with 
employment statutes such as the FLSA and the NLRA.
249
  A determination 
that two separate entities are in fact, joint employers, generally involves a 
fact-intensive inquiry.
250
 
Joint employer status has been defined a bit differently by some 
courts.  Indeed, one commentator, Professor Cynthia Estlund, has noted 
that the issue of joint employer status under the FLSA “continues to puzzle 
and divide the courts.”
251
 
In a 2003 FLSA case, the Second Circuit exhaustively analyzed the 
case law concerning joint employment and held that in determining 
whether or not there is joint employment the following, non-exclusive 
factors should be examined: 
1. The equipment and premises of work; 
2. Whether the corporations in question “had a business that 
could or did shift as a unit from one putative joint employer 
to another;” 
3. The “extent to which the plaintiff performed a discrete line 
job that was integral to” the “process of production” of the 
putative joint employer; 
4. Whether responsibility under contracts could pass from one 
employer subcontractor to another without material change; 
5. The degree of supervision by the putative joint employer; 
 
 247. See ALR, supra note 151, § 2[a]. 
 248. Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 192–93, 195 (1973) (holding that building owner 
and maintenance company were joint employers of maintenance workers, even though 
contractual provision stated that these workers were employed by the building owner).  
Today, regulations under the FLSA, 29 C.F.R. § 791.2 (2011), expressly recognize that 
there can be a joint employment relationship.  See Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co., 355 F.3d 
61, 66 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussing joint employer status under the FLSA). 
 249. Lopez v. Silverman, 14 F. Supp. 2d 405, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); LeSaint Logistics, 
Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 1051 (1997); Capital EMI Music, Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 997 (1993). 
 250. Zheng, 355 F.3d at 76 (2d Cir. 2003) (observing that “historical findings of fact . . .  
underlie each of the relevant factors” coupled with “findings as to the existence and degree 
of each factor”). 
 251. CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE 110 (2010). 
RUBINSTEIN_FINALIZEDONE (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2012  11:22 AM 
2012] EMPLOYEES, EMPLOYERS AND QUASI-EMPLOYERS 649 
 
6. Whether the plaintiffs “worked exclusively or predominantly 
for the” putative joint employer.
252
 
The NLRB describes joint employer status as follows: 
The joint employer concept recognizes that two or more business 
entities are in fact separate but that they share or codetermine 
those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of 
employment . . . .  To establish joint employer status there must 
be a showing that the employer meaningfully affects matters 
relating to the employment relationship such as hiring, firing, 
discipline, supervision and direction.
253
 
In an appeal of an NLRB case, the Second Circuit explained that “an 
essential element” of any joint employer determination is “sufficient 
evidence of immediate control over the employees . . . .”
254
 
Joint employer status has also been litigated under the FMLA,
255
 the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
256
 as well as under a host of other employment 
laws such as Title VII.
257
  Therefore, it is important for lawyers and 
scholars to be aware of this theory. 
1. Professional Employer Organizations 
A Professional Employer Organization (“PEO”) is a contractual 
arrangement that purports to define the employer relationship.  Typically, 
the PEO assumes responsibility to administer and comply with employment 
laws, while the original employer or client continues to run the business.
258
  
 
 252. Zheng, 355 F.3d at 72 (2d Cir. 2003).  But see Dias v. Cmty. Action Project, No. 
07-CV-5163, 2009 WL 595601, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2009) (examining several different 
but related factors to determine joint employer status). 
 253. Laerco Transp. & Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. 324, 325 (1984).  See also AT&T v. 
NLRB, 67 F.3d 446, 451 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing joint employer status under the NLRA); 
La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 337 N.L.R.B. 1120 (2002), aff’d, 71 F. App’x 441 (5th Cir. 2003) 
(agreeing with administrative law judge’s finding that respondent was not a joint employer); 
LeSaint Logistics, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 1051 (1997). 
 254. Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ v. NLRB, 647 F.3d 435, 442 
(2d Cir. 2011) (footnote omitted) (quoting Clinton’s Ditch Cooperative Co. v. NLRB, 778 
F.2d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 255. See, e.g., Almeida v. Athena Health Care Assocs., No. 3:07CV517 (PCD), 2009 
WL 490066, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 26, 2009) (discussing joint employer status). 
 256. See, e.g., McMullin v. Ashcroft, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (2004) (holding that 
Rehabilitation Act did not provide for private right of action). 
 257. See, e.g., Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 611 F. Supp. 
344, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (clarifying statutory text by noting that “Title VII does not refer 
to ‘employee’ but to ‘the person aggrieved,’” thus bringing plaintiff’s action “within the 
ambit of Title VII . . . .”). 
 258. See What is a PEO?, NAPEO.ORG, http://www.napeo.org/peoindustry/ 
coemployers.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2012). 
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The employees are often said to be leased employees of the PEO.
259
  Thus, 
the theory is that leased employees are employed by the PEO.
260
  The 
National Association of Professional Employer Organizations, a national 
trade group, considers such an arrangement to be “co-employment,” but it 
does not describe the significance of co-employment.
261
 
Because of this duality of responsibility, it is considered by this 
commentator to be a type of a quasi-employer relationship.
262
 
There has not been a significant amount of employment litigation 
involving the status of PEO’s as employers.
263
  In LeSaint Logistics, Inc.,
264
 
a PEO that provided payroll and human resources, handled workers 
compensation paycheck deductions and inspections for a client employer 
was found not to be a joint employer.  Significantly, the PEO played no 
role in the day-to-day operations of the business or with respect to the 
 
 259. See Stone, supra note 22, at 251 (discussing concept of employee leasing); Ariel D. 
Weindling, Effective Management of a Contingent Workforce: A Brief Overview of Using 
Contingent Workers, IBA LEGAL PRACTICE DIV. (Emp’t & Indus. Relations Law Comm.), 
Apr. 2008, at 1 (discussing employee leasing firms and professional employer 
organizations); see also Metro. Chi., Inc., NLRB Case No. 13-RC-20098 (Decision Nov. 12, 
1999), available at http://mynlrb.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45800c8ff6 (utilizing 
the term “leased employees” when discussing whether PEO was a joint employer); LeSaint 
Logistics, Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. 1051, 1062 (1997) (concluding that respondent PEO held itself 
out “as an employer or joint employer of the employees,” but was “an employer only in an 
administrative sense.”). 
  The New York State Department of Labor, charged with administering the New 
York Professional Employer Act, N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 915–24 (McKinney 2002), placed 
professional employer associations under the same category as employee leasing firms, 
which indicates that the two classes of organizations are the same or similar.  Professional 
Employer Associations, N.Y.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.labor.state.ny.us./ 
workerprotection/laborstandards/employer/peo.shtm (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).  While it is 
recognized that the term used by the New York State Department of Labor is “Professional 
Employer Association.” as opposed to a “Professional Employer Organization,” it appears 
that these terms are one and the same. 
 260. Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical 
and Comparative Perspective on Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 
158–60 (2003) (defining leased employees as employed by an employee leasing firm, but 
who provide services for a separate firm). 
 261. See id. 
 262. Some firms chose to enter into a PEO relationship because it would enable them to 
take advantage of economies of scale. Outsourcing employment law responsibility enables 
small and medium-sized businesses with an expertise that they might not normal have.  A 
large PEO may also be able to obtain much more favorable insurance rates than a smaller 
company.  See Weindling, supra note 259. 
 263. Issues with regard to responsibility for unemployment insurance tax, Matter of 
Robsonwoese, Inc., 840 N.Y.S. 2d 638, 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding both PEO and 
client employer are responsible for payment of Unemployment tax), as well as Workers 
Compensation, Gray v. Johnson Employment Services, No. CA10-62, 2010 WL 4983129, at 
*2 (Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2010) (holding that PEO can assert a Workers Compensation defense), 
have arisen. 
 264. 324 N.L.R.B. 1051 (1997). 
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development of the terms and conditions of employment.
265
 
The Board reached this result by applying joint employer law and 
concluded that the PEO and the client company did not share or 
codetermine matters governing significant and essential terms and 
conditions of employment.
266
 
Indeed, the analysis utilized by the Labor Board is consistent with 
case law addressing the joint employment status of employers (who are not 
organized as a PEO) that provide payroll and other administrative services.  
NLRB law is clear that simply outsourcing this function, without more, 
does not establish a joint employment relationship.
267  
Though the case law is still developing in this area, based upon the 
case law that has developed, the fact that a firm is organized as a PEO 
appears to be largely irrelevant to joint employer status.  Rather, the focus 
is on substance of how the organization is run and controlled as opposed to 
the form of the organization. 
E. Single Employer Theory 
In labor relations, the single employer theory is often invoked by a 
union in order to prevent an employer from using double-breasted 
operations where it shifts work from a unionized plant to a non-union 
facility.
268
  The non-union facility is essentially an “alter ego” of the 
unionized facility and an employer would be able to evade the requirements 
of its labor agreement if such practices were permitted.
269
 
The single employer doctrine is invoked in a number of other 
situations involving labor and employment law.  Some common examples 
include:  when necessary to satisfy the amounts effecting interstate 
commerce to establish NLRA jurisdiction,
270
 to assert coverage over work 
under a collective bargaining agreement,
271
 to collect unpaid pension fund 
contributions for work performed by employees at the non-union or alter 
 
 265. Id. at 1062. 
 266. Id. at 1061–62; see also Metro. Chi., Inc., 13-RC-20098 (Nov. 12, 1999) (same 
notwithstanding the fact that the PEO had a representative at the worksite). 
    267.   Rome Electrical Systems, Inc., 356 NLRB No. 38 (Nov. 24, 2010) (finding joint 
employment relationship due to transfer of assets between entities in addition to payroll 
services); La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 337 N.L.R.B. 1120 (2002), enforced without op., 71 
Fed. Appx. 441 (5th Cir. 2003) (declining to find that company solely offering payroll 
services was a joint employer). 
 268. S. Calif. Paint & Allied Trades v. Rodin & Co., 558 F.3d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
 269. DAU-SCHMIDT, supra note 30 (2009) (discussing double breasted operations). 
 270. See, e.g., Radio & Television Broad. Technicians Local 1264 v. Broadcast Serv. of 
Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256–57 (1965). 
 271. See, e.g., CWA v. U.S. W. Direct, 847 F.2d 1475, 1477–78 (10th Cir. 1988). 
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ego facility,
272
 to obtain information about the duty to bargain with the 
union,
273
 or to impose a bargaining obligation on an entity where the 
employees appear ostensibly to be employed by another employer.
274
 
Some examples of single employers include a hospital and a 
partnership of doctors that contracted with the hospital for office space, 
secretarial services and where a corporation and its two wholly owned 
subsidiaries operated adult movie theaters and book stores.
275
 
In labor relations, to establish a single employer relationship, the 
following factors are examined:  1) whether operations are interrelated; 2) 
whether common management exists; 3) whether the parties have common 
ownership or financial control; and, 4) whether centralized control of labor 
relations exists.
276
  This is sometimes referred as the four-factor test.
277
 
While the totality of the circumstances controls the Board’s 
determination,
278
 all four factors are not necessarily equal.  In labor cases, 
the Board often gives more weight to centralized control of labor relations 
factor.
279
  This factor has been described as being “critical” to a finding of 
single employer status.
280
 
Single employer status litigation is not limited to traditional labor law 
litigation. Outside traditional labor law, such as under Title VII, the single 
employer doctrine is invoked in the parent/subsidiary context
281
 as well as 
 
 272. See, e.g., Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489, 
514–15 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 273. See, e.g., Dodger Theatricals Holding, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. 953, 968–69 (2006). 
 274. HIGGINS, supra note 16, at 2242 (discussing single employer doctrine). 
 275. Id. at 2245–56 (citing authorities). 
 276. Radio & Television Broad. Technicians Local Union 1264 v. Broad. Serv. of 
Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965).  See also South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Operating 
Eng’rs Local 627, 425 U.S. 800, 802 (1976) (quoting Radio & Television 4 factor test with 
approval). 
 277. Paint America Services, Inc., 353 NLRB NO. 100, at *1 (Feb. 25, 2009) (using four-
factor test language); accord, Carnival Carting v. NLRB, Nos. 10-3408-ag (L), 10-3410-ag 
(AXP), 2012 WL 10968 (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2012). 
 278. Dow Chem. Co., 326 N.L.R.B. 288, 288 (1988) (employing totality of the 
circumstances analysis). 
 279. See, e.g., Mercy Hosp. of Buffalo, 336 N.L.R.B. 1282, 1284 (2001); accord, 
Marvelli v. Chaps Cmty. Health Ctr., 193 F. Supp. 2d 636, 653 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Dias v. 
Cmty. Action Project, No. 07-CV-5163, 2009 WL 595601, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2009) 
(same under Title VII); Almeida v. Athena Health Care Assocs., No. 3:07CV517 (PCD), 
2009 WL 490066, at *5 (D. Conn. Feb. 26, 2009). 
 280. HIGGINS, supra note 16, at 2244.  However, control of labor relations is not in and 
of itself determinative.  Id. at 2244 n.172. 
 281. Cook v. Arrowsmith Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1241 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding 
that single employer test is appropriate standard under Title VII in determining whether 
parent companies may be considered employer of subsidiary’s employees); Dias, 2009 WL 
595601 at *7; Morrow v. Metro. Transit Auth., No. 08 Civ. 6123 (DLC), 2009 U.S. Dist. 
Lexis 39252, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2009) (same). 
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in other situations.
282
  As in traditional labor law, the control of labor 
relations factor is especially important.
283
 
Interestingly, the Second Circuit under Title VII views the single and 
joint employer tests as one test.
284
  In effect, however, the Second Circuit 
was really only examining the single employer test because it was 
describing the four single employer factors (1. interrelation of operations, 
2. centralized control of labor relations, common management, and 4. 
common ownership or control).
285
  The Second Circuit also held that this 
test is not applicable to governmental employers because it may raise 
constitutional issues that can alter the regulatory balance established by the 
government.
286
 
In any event, under a single employer theory, “all the employees of 
the constituent entities are employees of the overarching integrated entity, 
and all of those employees may be aggregated to determine whether it 
employs fifteen employees,”
287
 which is a threshold determination under 
Title VII.  The policy that the law seeks to protect is one of fairness.  It 
allows for the imposition of liability when two nominally independent 
entities do not have an arm’s length relationship with one another.
288
 
F. Individual Supervisory Liability Theory 
Individuals are not normally considered “employers.”  Obviously, 
they do not have a direct employment relationship with employees.  Since 
they in fact may be considered an employer and held individually liable as 
an employer, they are treated as a quasi-employer by this commentator.   
The issue of liability of individuals as employers may seem 
counterintuitive at first since individuals, in most cases, are not personally 
liable for the actions of the corporation and the individuals who may face 
liability as employers are employees themselves.  Like so many areas of the 
law, the answer to the legal question whether an individual can be held 
liable as an employer is complex and the real answer is that “it depends.”  
 
 282. Sanford v. Main St. Baptist Church Manor, Inc., No. 10-5323, 2011 WL 6016247 
(6th Cir. Dec. 5, 2011). 
 283. Morrow, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 39252, at *5.  This factor includes such tasks as 
administering job applications and personnel status reports.  Id. 
 284. See, e.g., Gulino v. N.Y.S. Educ. Dep’t., 460 F.3d 361, 378 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 375, 378.  Unfortunately, the court did not provide any analysis or examples 
supporting this statement. 
 287. Arculeo v. On-Site Sales & Marketing, LLC, 425 F.3d 193, 199 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(emphasis in original) (Title VII case).  See also Dias v. Cmty. Action Project, No. 07-CV-
5163, 2009 WL 595601, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2009) (same); Cook v. Arrowsmith 
Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1240 (2d Cir. 1995) (same). 
 288. See, e.g., Dias, 2009 WL 595601, at *3; Paint America Services, Inc., 353 NLRB 
No. 100, at *1 (Feb. 25, 2009). 
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Depends upon what?  It depends on the language and the intent of the 
employment statute at issue. 
Title VII provides that the term “employer” means a person engaged 
in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees.
289
  
In Miller v. Maxwell’s International, the Ninth Circuit held that a 
supervisor could not be held responsible as an “agent” under Title VII 
because the “obvious purpose” of the agent provision was to import the law 
of respondent superior liability upon the employer.
290
 
The court also found support from the fact that by limiting coverage to 
employers who have fifteen or more employees, Congress desired to shield 
small employers from the reach of the statute.
291
 Therefore, it was 
inconceivable to the Ninth Circuit that this same Congress intended to 
subject individuals to personal liability.
292
 
The Second Circuit later recognized that although supervisory liability 
could be found under a strict reading of the term “agent” in the statute, the 
court refused to read Title VII in such a manner because that would be 
contrary to the intent of Congress.
293
  The court then followed the analysis 
utilized in Maxwell.  Though the Supreme Court has not addressed this 
issue, all twelve circuits have concluded that there is no individual 
supervisory liability under Title VII.
294
  Courts have come to the same 
conclusion under the Americans with Disabilities
295
 Act
296
 and the Age 
 
 289. 42 U.S.C. § 2001(b) (2006). 
 290. 991 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 291. Id. at 587. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313–14 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 294. See, e.g., Fantini v. Salem State College, 557 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2009); Tomka v. 
Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313–17 (2d Cir. 1995); Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 
551–53 (3d Cir. 1996); Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180–82 (4th Cir. 1998); 
Amolie v. Orleans Sch. Bd., 48 Fed. Appx. 917, 917 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Wathen v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405–06 (6th Cir. 1997); Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 
137 F.3d 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1998); Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 379–
81 (8th Cir. 1995); Holly D. v. Cal. Inst. of Tech., 339 F.3d 1158, 1179 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587–88 (9th Cir. 1993); Haynes v. Williams, 
88 F.3d 898, 900–01 (10th Cir. 1996); Cross v. Alabama, 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 (11th Cir. 
1995); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, ET 
AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 33 (2d ed. 2011) (stating 
that Miller has been widely followed). 
 295. Like Title VII, the ADA defines an employer as:  “a person . . . who has 15 or more 
employees . . . and any agent of such person . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2006). 
 296. See, e.g., Corr v. MTA Long Island Bus., No. 98-9417, 1999 WL 980960, at *2 (2d 
Cir. Oct. 7, 1999), aff’d, 199 F.3d 1321 (2d Cir. 1999); Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 
161, 178 (3d Cir. 2002); Ford v. Frame, 3 Fed. Appx. 316, 318 (6th Cir. 2001); Sullivan v. 
River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804, 808 n.1 (6th Cir. 1999); Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 
344, 346 (7th Cir. 2000); Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 797 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999); 
Butler v. City of Prairie Vill., 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir. 1999); Pritchard v. S. Co. Servs., 
102 F.3d 1118, 1119 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996). 
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Discrimination
297
 in Employment Act.
298
 
Yet, individuals have been found liable as employers under other 
employment statutes such as the FMLA,
299
 FLSA,
300
 and state employment 
law statutes
301
—at least where they had supervisory authority over the 
plaintiff. 
 
 297. Like Title VII, the ADEA states that the term employer “also means (1) any agent 
of such a person . . . .”  29 U.S.C. § 630(d) (2006). 
 298. See, e.g., Cerry v. Toussaint, 50 Fed. Appx. 476, 477 (2d Cir. 2002); Birbeck v. 
Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir. 1994); Medina v. Ramsey Steel Co., 238 
F.3d 674, 686 (5th Cir. 2001); Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Educ., No. 96-4331, 1998 WL 
57337, at *2 (6th Cir. 1998), aff’d,. 142 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1998); Horwitz v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Avoca Sch. Dist. No. 37, 260 F.3d 602, 610, n.2 (7th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 
402, 404 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995); Miller, 991 F.2d at 597-88. 
 299. Under the FMLA, the definition of an employer includes any person who acts 
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer.  29 U.S.C. § 2611(4).  See Dewan v. 
Universal Granite & Marble, Inc., No. 08-C-350, 2009 WL 590499 *6 (N. D. Ill. Mar. 6, 
2009) (holding supervisor individually liable as employer under FMLA); Pedersen v. 
Western Petroleum, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-997 TS, 2008 WL 977379 *7 (D. Utah Apr. 9, 2008) 
(same); Wilson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 05 C 6408, 2006 WL 1749662 *2 
(N.D. Ill. June 21, 2006) (discussing supervisory liability); Brewer v. Jefferson-Pilot 
Standard Life Ins., 333 F. Supp. 2d 433, 437 (M.D. N.C. 2004) (same); Richardson v. CVS 
Corp., 207 F. Supp.2d 733, 741-42 (E.D. Tenn. 2001) (same). see also Alcazar-Anselmo v. 
City of Chi., No. 07 C 5246, 2008 WL 1805380 *2 (N.D. Ill. April 18, 2008) (discussing 
supervisory liability under FMLA and FLSA; the court does not undertake any different 
type of analysis because public employer is involved).  But see, Haybarger v. Lawrence Co. 
Adult Probation & Parole, 667 F.3d 408 (3d Cir. 2012) (same, but discussing that a conflict 
in the circuits exists with respect to the issue of individual liability of supervisors under the 
FMLA in the public sector). 
      The issue of individual liability under the FMLA has been “percolating” for over a 
decade.  Sandra Sperino, Under Construction: Questioning Whether Statutory Construction 
Principles Justify Individual Liability Under The Family And Medical Leave Act, 71 MO. L. 
REV. 71, 71 (2006) (extensively analyzing individual liability under FMLA); David R. 
Mellon, Individual Liability As An “Employer” Under The Family And Medical Leave Act, 
22 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 449 (1998) (extensively discussing individual liability under FMLA 
and comparing FMLA to other employment statutes). 
 300. See e.g., Chao v. Hotel Oasis, Inc., 493 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 2007); Herman v. RSR 
Security Svcs. Ltd., 172 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1999); U.S. Dep’t. of Labor v. Cole Enters., 
Inc., 62 F.3d 775, 778-779 (6th Cir. 1995); Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 694 (7th 
Cir. 1987); Boucher v. Shaw, 572 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009); Freemon v. Foley, 911 F. 
Supp. 326, 331 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
 301. Hill v. Ford Motor Co., 277 S.W. 3d 659, 669 (Mo. 2009) (noting that under state 
law, individuals can face liability as a person acting in the interest of the employer); Butler 
v. Hartford Technical Inst., 704 A. 2d 222, 227 (Conn. 1997) (finding individual civil 
liability under Connecticut state law because a criminal statute held employer officers and 
agents responsible for unpaid wages); Chung v. New Silver Place Restaurant, Inc., 272 F. 
Supp. 2d 314, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that under New York law an individual can be 
liable as employer for unpaid wages if he or she has control over employment).  By statute, 
Illinois, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 115/13 (2008) and Kansas, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-323(b), 
expressly permits officers and agents to be personally liable as employer’s for unpaid 
wages. 
  By contrast, the Nevada Supreme Court held that there was no individual liability 
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The FLSA, for example, defines employer as “any person acting 
directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 
employee.”
302
  In Boucher v. Shaw, the Ninth Circuit held that there cannot 
be individual liability under the FLSA unless the person in question 
exercises “control over the nature and structure of the employment 
relationship, or economic control . . . .” 
303
  This standard was easily met as 
two of the three individual defendants had a respective seventy and thirty 
percent ownership interest and all three defendants had control and custody 
over the plaintiff’s employment.
304
 
Richardson v. CVS Corp. is an instructive, well-reasoned FMLA 
case.
305
  The court refused to follow Title VII case law, which held that 
individual supervisors could not be held liable because of the differing 
statutory language.  The court reasoned that the FMLA definition of an 
employer, which is the same as under the FLSA (“any person who acts, 
directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer”), is broader than the 
word “agent” as used in Title VII.
306
 
In determining whether there can be individual liability as an 
employer, the court looked to the economic realities of the relationship and 
considered factors such as whether the individual had an ownership 
interest, whether the individual controlled day-to-day operations, and 
whether the individual determined salaries.
307
  Notably, the individual 
 
under Nevada law, which has a wage protection statute that defines employer as including 
“every person having control or custody of any employment, place of employment or any 
employee.”  NEV. REV. STAT. § 608.011.  Despite this seemingly broad definition, the 
Nevada Supreme Court held that in the absence of clear legislative intent, it was not going 
to presume that the state legislature intended to equate individual managers with employers. 
Boucher v. Shaw, 196 P.3d 959, 963 (Nev. 2008); accord, Leonard v. McMorris, 63 P.3d 
323 (Colo. 2003) (corporate officers and agents not liable under Colorado wage and hour 
law). 
 302. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (2006). 
 303. Boucher, 196 P.3d at 960 (Nev. 2008) (quoting Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 
1012 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). 
 304. Id. See also Gray v. Powers, No. 10-20808, 2012 WL 638497 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that a member of a limited liability corporation was not an employer under the 
FLSA applying the economic realities test).  
 305. 207 F. Supp. 2d 733 (E.D. Tenn. 2001); see also Evans v. Henderson, No. 99 C 
8332, 2000 WL 1161075 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2000) (employing a similar analysis in the 
public sector context). 
 306. Richardson, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 742. 
 307. Id. at 744.  Significantly, the court held that these were not the only factors that 
could be considered.  In using the term “economic realities,” it is not entirely clear whether 
the court was referring to the economic reality test, which is used to examine whether or not 
an individual is an employee.  See supra notes 99–108 and accompanying text; see also 
Sperino, supra note 299, at 76 (2006) (stating that most courts have interpreted the FMLA 
to permit individual liability if the person was acting on behalf of the private employer). 
  While this Article focuses on individual liability of supervisors employed by private 
employers, it should be noted that there is a conflict in the circuits concerning this issue 
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defendant who faced personal liability was not a director or officer, but 
rather a district manager.
308
 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has reviewed how courts continue to struggle with the 
definition of an employee under current employment law.  Part of this 
struggle may be due to the fact that there is tension amongst employers 
who want to control their workers while simultaneously avoiding liability 
under this nation’s labor and employment laws.  Part of the confusion may 
be inherent in the common law system or may be caused by poorly worded 
statutes.  Whatever the cause, categorizing an employee is clearly 
problematic, and therefore it should come as no surprise that courts are also 
struggling with the definition of an employer. 
Determining employer status often involves difficult issues because 
there is a large variety of employers, and because the nature of work is 
continuously changing.  This Article explored the employer status of quasi-
employers, who, to borrow a phrase from the Supreme Court, are in the 
borderland between employers and non-employers.
309
 
The notion that quasi-employers may be subject to our nation’s labor 
and employment laws is not a unique proposition.  In other contexts, third 
parties are subject to labor and employment regulation even though they do 
not directly employ the individuals in question.  This Article has discussed 
several examples of this including the regulation of secondary boycotts and 
the controlling employer policy under OSHA.
310
 
As this Article demonstrates, simply because one is not labeled an 
employer, does not mean that he or she is not in fact an employer.  The 
same is true, of course, with respect to an employee.  This Article has 
documented at least five situations where quasi-employer liability can be 
found.  They are the Sibley Interference theory where employer 
responsibility is found because the employer interferes with the 
employment of an employee; the related Spirt delegation theory where a 
third party is held responsible as an employer because it has been delegated 
 
under the FMLA with respect to whether public officials employed by a public employer 
can be held individually liable as employers.  Rutland v. Pepper, 404 F.3d 921, 923 n.1 (5th 
Cir. 2005).  This is because the term “public agency” is separately defined.  See Haybarger, 
supra note 299 (analyzing this issue); Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 827 (6th Cir. 
2003) (discussing this issue); Sperino, supra note 299, at n.26 (noting conflicting case law 
with respect to the imposition of personal liability in the public sector).  Compare 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2611(4)(A), with 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(B). 
 308. Richardson, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 744.  But see Sperino, supra note 299, at 71–72 
(criticizing courts for only undertaking a cursory analysis of this issue). 
 309. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’s., Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944). 
 310. See supra notes 186–192 and accompanying text. 
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an important responsibility that effects the terms and conditions of 
employees; the joint employer theory where two separate businesses can 
both be considered the employer; and the related single employer theory 
where two nominally separate businesses can be considered a single 
employer.  Finally, under certain statutes, supervisors can be personally 
liable and therefore, they are considered to be a quasi-type of employer. 
Quasi-employers are as fully responsible as traditional employers.  
Therefore, it is important for the law to have a clear definition of who an 
employer is so both employees and employers know what their rights and 
responsibilities are.  The consequences of not being able to identify the 
proper employer can, of course, be fatal to any litigation.
311
   
In labor and employment law today, the question of who an employer 
is remains of paramount concern because liability is almost wholly 
dependent upon employer status.
312
  No matter what one’s views are with 
respect to the controversial case law and issues cited herein, uniformity in 
the law is necessary.  The time is ripe for an authoritative distinction 
among the definitions of employee, quasi-employer, and employer. 
Future work environments will almost certainly look very different 
from those of today.  Outlining clear criteria to define employment status is 
necessary in order to provide future generations with guidelines with which 
to analyze those environments.
313
  It is hoped that this Article will help 
 
 311. In Dejoie v. Medley, Jr., 9 So.2d 826 (La. 2009), for example, the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana dismissed an employment discrimination case brought under state law against the 
state because the state was not the plaintiff’s employer.  See also Okoi v. El Al Israel 
Airlines, Index No. 05-5370 (DRH)(WDW), 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9610 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 
2009) (dismissing a Title VII claim against an airline because it was not the plaintiff’s 
employer); Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability For Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. 
EMPL. & LAB. L. 1, 13 (2010) (stating that only employers are liable for improper working 
condition violations). 
  With respect to the issue of employee status (as opposed to employer status), if an 
individual is not an employee they generally do not receive any statutory protection.  See, 
e.g., Feldmann v N.Y. Life Ins. Co, No. 4:09CV2129MLM, 2011 WL 382201 (E.D. Mo, 
Feb. 3, 2011) (holding that an independent contractor is not protected under Title VII); Kern 
v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that Title VII is an employment 
statute applicable only to employees and prospective employees); Murphy v. ERA Realty, 
674 N.Y.S. 2d 415, 416 (holding similarly under state human rights law).  But see Richard 
Bales & Lindsay Mongenas, Defining Independent Contractor Protection Under the 
Rehabilitation Act, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 435 (2011) (discussing conflict in the circuits over 
the issue of whether independent contractors are protected against discrimination on the 
basis of disability under the Rehabilitation Act).  See generally Lofaso, supra note 62, at 
499 (2010). 
 312. Brishen Rogers, Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. 
EMPL. & LAB. L. 1, 12–15 (2010) (criticizing the limitation of liability under the FLSA 
which is limited to employers and arguing for broader responsibility for third parties who 
effectively control the supply of commerce). 
 313. See Altman, supra note 197 (discussing the potential work force of the future).  
More than a decade ago, the late Professor Clyde Summers indicated that approximately 25–
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bring clarity to the area of uncertainty in the borderland between employers 
and non-employers and between employees and non-employees. 
 
 
30% of the work force is engaged in a form of peripheral employment other than traditional 
full-time work.  Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United States, 18 COMP. 
LAB. L. J. 503, 519–20 (1997). 
